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D EPRECIATION for federal income tax purposes is a device by which
the taxpayer receives a tax benefit for the acquisition cost of long life
property. Depreciation allows the taxpayer an annual income tax deduction
over the useful life of the property for a portion of the cost of the property.
It is a device to determine more accurately the periodic net income of the
taxpayer, because the cost of long life property is an expense which should
be accounted for during the time period in which the property produces
revenues. Although depreciation might seem to be a fairly staid and non-
* B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M. (in Taxation), New York University. As-
sociate Professor of Law, University of Alabama.
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controversial subject, it is not. Due to varying social and political pressures,
depreciation provisions in the Internal Revenue Code have proliferated and
have generated considerable controversy. It has been alleged that deprecia-
tion can be used to increase investment in depreciable property;1 to increase
the number of jobs in the economy, hold down prices, relieve pressure on
the capital markets, and reduce or steady interest rates;2 and even to win the
cold war with Russia. 3 On the other hand, components of contemporary
depreciation have been criticized as wasteful,4 outmoded, 5 and unfair;6 and
complete elimination of the depreciation deduction has been proposed.7
This Article considers various elements of the concept of depreciation for
federal income tax purposes. Initially, the historical development of the
depreciation concept is considered. Next, depreciation as it presently exists
under the Internal Revenue Code is presented, and various options for
changing depreciation are evaluated. Finally, current issues facing policy
makers are explained.
I. HISTORY OF DEPRECIATION
In many respects depreciation is an unusual feature of financial and tax
accounting. Although depreciation is considered an expense of generating
revenues, it is different from other expenses in that depreciation involves no
current cash expenditure because the expenditure was made previously
when the property was acquired. Nonetheless, today it is considered appro-
priate and necessary to spread the cost over the useful life of the depreciable
property in determining net income. Historically, however, the appropri-
ateness and necessity of a depreciation deduction has been quite controver-
sial.
The history of depreciation includes both a tax history and a financial
accounting history. The formulation of financial accounting depreciation
concepts preceded congressional adoption of a depreciation deduction.
Thus, the meaning of depreciation for financial accounting purposes is
indicative of the meaning of depreciation which Congress intended for tax
purposes. Moreover, the financial accounting meaning and the tax meaning
are essentially related in that they both seek to allocate the cost of long life
assets over their useful lives so as to reflect net income accurately.' Accord-
ingly, the concept of depreciation for financial accounting purposes is rele-
vant to the study of depreciation for federal income tax purposes.
I. Terborgh, Depreciation as an Element in Investment Decisions, in DEPRECIATION AND
TAXES 28 (1958).
2. Peloubet, Depreciation Reform, in 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 891, 897 (Comm. Print 1959).
3. Hogan, Depreciation Reform, in id. at 925, 925-31.
4. 5 Tax Reform: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3323, 3328 (1975) (Statement of Richard B. Robinson, American Machine Tool Dis-
tributors Association).
5. 1 Tax Reform: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., I st
Sess. 88, 88 (1975) (statement of Walker Winter).
6. 123 CONG. REC. S 11,408, S 11,411 (daily ed. July 1, 1977) (statement of Senator Edward
Kennedy).
7. Eisner, Effects of Depreciation Allowances for Tax Purposes, in 2 HOUSE COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 793, 799 (Comm. Print
1959).
8. A. MURRAY, DEPRECIATION 5 (1971).
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A. Financial Accounting History
Rudimentary financial records date back to the earliest reaches of civiliza-
tion,9 but early record keeping was simplistic and unsophisticated by current
standards, reflecting the less complicated economic and financial systems of
the day.' 0 The earliest direct references to depreciation appeared in the
sixteenth century." Prior to that time, most economic activity revolved
around agriculture and horticulture, operations which were labor-intensive
rather than machinery-intensive. 2 Because only a small element in the
productive process was depreciable,' 3 relatively little concern about depreci-
ation was generated.14 Another reason why depreciation was largely ignored
was that most of the agricultural operations were directly supervised by the
persons who owned the enterprise. 5 Thus, there were no absent owners to
whom an accurate determination of income had to be provided. This
contrasts with contemporary enterprises where most investors are passive
nonparticipants and actual operations are performed by professional man-
agers. Moreover, because such owner-operated enterprises were sold only
infrequently, the accurate determination of periodic income was less im-
portant.' 6
With the onset of the industrial revolution, business activities became
increasingly larger and complex,17 necessitating more sophisticated financial
information systems. The industrial revolution also brought into use large
amounts of equipment, resulting in more capital intensive industry with
greater depreciation potential. Thus, proper depreciation accounting be-
came more important in correctly analyzing the financial results of the
industrial activity. ' 8
An additional factor which contributed to the acceptance of depreciation
was the appearance of the publicly owned company.' 9 Because ownership
interests were traded publicly and with some frequency, the current value of
the interests were important to the owners. The owner of an interest in a
publicly traded enterprise is concerned about depreciation for several rea-
sons. Depreciation affects the income or loss of the enterprise, and the rate
of return on the interest is a major determinant of the value of the interest.20
If depreciation is too low, income and the value of the interest would be
9. H. BENTLEY, A BRIEF TREATISE OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ACCOUNTING 5-6
(1929).
10. Id.
11. See E. SALIERS, DEPRECIATION 8-9 (3d ed. 1939); Mason, Illustrations of the Early
Treatment of Depreciation, 8 ACCOUNTING REV. 209 (1933).
12. See generally S. CLOUGH, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION
(1959).
13. E. SALIERS, DEPRECIATION 8 (3d ed. 1939).
14. Id.
15. P. LEAKE, DEPRECIATION AND WASTING ASSETS XX (2d ed. 1917).
16. Id.
17. E. SALIERS, DEPRECIATION 10 (3d ed. 1939).
18. W. HOGAN, DEPRECIATION POLICIES AND RESULTANT PROBLEMS 2 (Studies in Industrial
Economics No. 8, 1967).
19. P. LEAKE, DEPRECIATION AND WASTING ASSETS xix (2d ed. 1917); E. MATHESON, THE
DEPRECIATION OF FACTORIES 4 (2d ed. 1893).
20. See R. BADGER & P. COFFMAN, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 228
(1967). But cf. G. MCCARTHY & R. HEALY, VALUING A COMPANY 103-04 (1971) (arguing the lack
of significance of book value).
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overstated; if depreciation is too high, income and the value of the interest
would be understated.
Another reason why the owner is concerned about depreciation is that the
value of his interest is influenced by the book value of the property owned
by the entity. 21 The book value of the property is calculated as the net
difference between the original acquisition cost and accumulated deprecia-
tion. If the accumulated depreciation on the property is too low, the book
value of the property and the value of the interest would be overstated; if the
accumulated depreciation is too high, the book value of the property and the
value of the interest would be understated.
A final reason why the owner of an interest in a publicly traded enterprise
is concerned about depreciation is the relationship between depreciation and
the ability of the entity to pay dividends to its owners.2 2 Generally, dividends
can be paid only from income, so as to preserve the permanent invested
capital of the enterprise. Some entities were prohibited from paying divi-
dends if sufficient provisions for depreciation were not made.23 Even where
the organic articles of the entity did not specifically require depreciation,
English authorities split as to whether a provision for depreciation was
required, with most courts concluding that such a provision was necessary.2 4
These prohibitions sought to treat all owners equally. 25 If insufficient depre-
ciation were taken, and excessive dividends were paid, the permanent
capital of the entity would be depleted. 26 If an owner sold the interest shortly
after the excessive dividend, that owner would receive a disproportionate
share of the value of the entity. The remaining owners would not be able to
receive dividends until the depreciation insufficiency was satisfied.
Thus, there were compelling reasons for standardized, periodic deprecia-
tion accounting. Even so, depreciation was often merely related to profit.
Management viewed depreciation as a device by which to level out the highs
and lows in the profitability of the entity. 27 In the years of low profit, little or
no depreciation would be taken; in years of high profit, large amounts of
depreciation would be taken. 28
An early United States Supreme Court decision with respect to deprecia-
tion was United States v. Kansas Pacific Railway,29 in which the statute
facilitating completion of the Union Pacific Railroad to the west coast was at
issue. The case turned on the requirement that the Kansas Pacific Railway
21. See G. MCCARTHY & R. HEALY, VALUING A COMPANY 334-36 (1971).
22. See generally R. KESTER, DEPRECIATION 99 (1924); E. SALIERS, DEPRECIATION 21 (3d ed.
1939).
23. Davison v. Gillies, [1879] 16 Ch. D. 347 n.l.
24. Compare Bond v. Barrow Haematite Steel Co., [1902] 1 Ch. 353, with Thomas v.
Crabtree, [1912] 106 L.T.R. 49.
25. E. MATHESON, THE DEPRECIATION OF FACTORIES 4 (2d ed. 1893).
26. R. KESTER, DEPRECIATION 99 (1924).
27. E. SALIERS, DEPRECIATION iii (2d ed. 1922).
28. Pyle, Depreciation-Accounting Concept or Political Tool?, 48 MANAGEMENT AC-
COUNTING 49, 49 (1967). Another reason why management would resist uniform depreciation
practices relates to over depreciation and the creation of "secret reserves." If the property is
depreciated too rapidly, the book value will be less than the market value, resulting in depres-
sion of the value of the ownership. Management, or knowledgeable insiders, therefore, might
be able to manipulate the price of the ownership interests, or take advantage of the depressed
value due to the secret reserves. See R. KESTER, DEPRECIATION 96-99 (1924).
29. 99 U.S. 455 (1878).
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pay to the government five percent of net earnings in repayment of principal
and interest on borrowed amounts. In determining net income under the
statute involved, the Supreme Court held that a depreciation deduction
could not be allowed because it was not an expenditure "actually made. "30
This was a rather parochial view of the depreciation concept. Although there
was no actual current expenditure, an expenditure had been made earlier
when the depreciable property was acquired. When the Supreme Court next
addressed the issue of depreciation, it was in the context of public utility
property. In City of Knoxville .v. Knoxville Water Co. 31 the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance which fixed water
rates. The maximum charge was dependent upon the rate of earnings on
invested capital of the water company. Under this statute the Court held that
depreciation was appropriate, indeed, even required, in order to preserve
the capital of the public service company. 32 Thus, the Knoxville Water Co.
decision established Supreme Court acceptance of the depreciation concept.
In addition to the judicial development of depreciation, the organized
financial accounting profession continued to press for standardized depreci-
ation practices. As the profession became more influential in controlling
accounting practices, the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants commissioned several subsidiary organizations to promulgate generally
accepted accounting principles. A declaration of financial accounting depre-
ciation policy was contained in Accounting Research Bulletin Number 3333
in 1953, and that policy was followed in 1965 in Accounting Research Study
Number 7.34 The thrust of such pronouncements was to require the regular
allocation of the cost of depreciable property over its useful life, as a charge
against income. Once depreciation methods were elevated to the status of
generally accepted accounting principles, noncompliance therewith would
cause the certified public accountant to qualify his opinion as to the client's
financial statements and make special disclosure of the noncompliance. 35
Thus, although there was no direct sanction from the accounting profession
for the utilization of improper depreciation methods, a qualified opinion
indicating improper depreciation deductions might impair the ability of the
30. Id. at 459.
31. 212 U.S. 1 (1909).
32. The Court stated:
Before coming to the question of profit at all the company is entitled to earn a
sufficient sum annually to provide not only for current repairs but for making
good the depreciation and replacing the parts of the property when they come to
the end of their life. The company is not bound to see its property gradually
waste, without making provision out of earnings for its replacement. It is entitled
to see that from earnings the value of the property invested is kept unimpaired, so
that at the end of any given term of years the original investment remains as it was
at the beginning. It is not only the right of the company to make such a provision,
but it is its duty to its bond and stockholders, and, in the case of a public service
corporation at least, its plain duty to the public.
Id. at 13-14.
33. COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS, AC-
COUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 33, RESTATEMENT OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS
67-91 (1953).
34. P. GRADY, INVENTORY OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES FOR BUS!-
NESS ENTERPRISES 148-56 (Accounting Research Study No. 7, 1965).
35. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, rule 203, at 20 (1974).
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client to raise funds in the capital markets. 36 For large, publicly owned
enterprises, a qualified opinion constituted a major impediment to financial
freedom and was something to be avoided. 37
Thus, gradually depreciation came to be recognized as a necessary
component of comprehensive financial reporting. The theoretical basis for
depreciation was that the cost of property should be allocated against
revenues during the useful life of the property. It took the proliferation of
publicly owned enterprises, however, to force uniform depreciation prac-
tices. Ultimately, the organized accounting profession was successful in
causing substantial compliance with standardized depreciation policy.
B. United States Tax History Through 1968
The history of depreciation as a part of the federal tax structure of the
United States dates back to early income tax and excise tax legislation. 38
Depreciation was not provided for in 1861, when the first federal income tax
statute was adopted, 39 or in subsequent tax laws enacted in 1862, 1864, 1865,
1867, and 1870.40 In fact, the Act of August 27, 1894, 41 seemed to prohibit
depreciation as an expense in computing income. 42
The first legislative indication that depreciation was a legitimate expense
in determining income for federal tax purposes came in the Tariff Act of
1909. 43 The Act imposed a corporate excise tax,' and permitted "a rea-
sonable allowance for depreciation of property, if any. ' 45 The Treasury
interpreted depreciation to mean the loss in value "that arises from exhaus-
tion, wear and tear, or obsolescence out of the uses to which the property is
put." 46
In 1913 ratification of the sixteenth amendment 47 removed the constitu-
tional barriers to an income tax. Subsequent to the ratification of the
amendment, Congress passed the Tariff Act of 1913,48 which imposed a tax
on corporate income 49 and allowed a deduction" for depreciation. The
36. Auditors Report Exception to GAAP in Publicly Owned Company, J. OF ACCOUNT-
ANCY, Feb. 1969, at 14, 16.
37. Id.
38. See generally W. HOGAN, DEPRECIATION POLICIES AND RESULTANT PROBLEMS 2 (Studies
in Industrial Economics No. 8, 1967; TAX FOUNDATION, INC., RESEARCH PUB. No. 24, DEPRECI-
ATION ALLOWANCES 17 & n.1 (1970)).
39. Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, §§ 49-51, 12 Stat. 292, 309-11 (repealed 1862).
40. See generally G. HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 8 (6th ed. 1925).
41. Ch. 349, §§ 27-37, 28 Stat. 509, 553-60. This Act levied a tax of two percent on the
"gains, profits and income" derived from any kind of property, rents, interest, dividends, or
salaries. Deductions were allowed for "the necessary expenses actually incurred in carrying on
any business occupation, or profession." These sections of the Act were held unconstitutional
in Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
42. The Act allowed no deduction "for any amount paid out for new buildings, permanent
improvements, or betterments, made to increase the value of any property." Act of Aug. 27,
1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553. Thus, the statute did not directly address the depreciation
issue, but did disallow any deduction with respect to capital expenditures.
43. Ch. 6, 36 Stat. II.
44. Id. § 38, 36 Stat. at 112.
45. Id. § 38, 36 Stat. at 113.
46. Treas. Reg. 31, art. 4, T.D. 1571 (1909).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
48. Ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
49. Id. § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. at 172.
50. Id. §§ II(B), (G)(b), 38 Stat. at 167, 172.
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Revenue Act of 191651 did not contain the word "depreciation," but au-
thorized "a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of
property arising out of its use and employment in the business or trade." 
52
The absence of any reference to obsolescence caused the Treasury, through
regulations, to prohibit any deduction attributable to obsolescence.53 The
Revenue Act of 1918, 54 however, restored obsolescence as an element of
depreciation .
In 1920 Bulletin F was first issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
56
Depreciation was a new concept to federal income taxation, and the Treas-
ury was willing to grant to the taxpayer primary authority for determining
the rate of depreciation. Accordingly, the bulletin stressed the difficulty and
uncertainty in determining the appropriate rate of depreciation57 and left
determination of the amount of depreciation to the taxpayer, subject to the
approval of the Commissioner. 58 Deductions were not challenged unless
shown unreasonable by clear and convincing evidence.59 The prevailing
notion was that so long as the total amount deducted was limited to acquisi-
tion cost, it made little difference as to the method to be used.
6°
The onset of the depression brought about a substantial stiffening by the
government with respect to depreciation deductions. In 1931 a revised
edition of Bulletin F, 6 1 along with a corollary report entitled Depreciation
Studies, was published, 62 ending the hands-off policy of the 1920's. The
report contained a schedule of suggested useful lives for depreciable indus-
trial assets. Although the new useful lives were only suggested, the schedule
provided a standard by which to judge the reasonableness of the deprecia-
51. Ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756.
52. Id. § 5(a), 39 Stat. at 759.
53. See also Gambrinus Brewery Co. v. Anderson, 282 U.S. 638, 643 (1931).
54. Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919).
55. Id. § 214(a)(8), 40 Stat. at 1067.
56. U.S. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BULL. "F" (1920).
Eventually, Bulletin F would become the source of useful life estimates for all depreciable
property.
57. The Bulletin stated:
Consideration of the elements entering into depreciation and of the many prob-
lems arising therefrom, involves questions of great difficulty, the solution of
which does not yield to exact determination in such a manner that precise rules of
treatment can be established or theoretical formulae deduced which can be
applied to all cases, or even to many. It is considered impracticable to prescribe
fixed definite rates of depreciation which would be allowable for all property of a
given class or character. The rate at which property depreciates necessarily
depends upon its character, locality, purpose for which used, and the conditions
under which it is used. Manufacturing plants in the same locality, doing identically
the same kind of business, depreciate at widely different rates, to a large extent
dependent upon the management and the fidelity with which repairs are made and
the property maintained; but so many other elements enter into the question that
even the relative importance of the different factors can be determined only with
difficulty and as approximations. The taxpayer should in all cases determine as
accurately as possible according to his judgment and experience the rate at which
his property depreciates. The rate used will, however, be subject to the approval
of the Commissioner.
Id. at 26-27.
58. Id. at 27.
59. Announcement 71-76, 1971-2 C.B. 503, 504 & n.9.
60. Id.
61. U.S. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BULL. "F" (rev. ed.
1931).
62. U.S. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, DEPRECIATION STUDIES
(1931).
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tion claimed by the taxpayer. Depreciation allowances had increased sub-
stantially during the period of 1924-1931, and in 1931 depreciation claimed
by corporations exceeded the amount of taxable corporate income. 63 The
situation was considered severe enough that in 1934 the House Ways and
Means Committee recommended an across-the-board reduction of twenty-
five percent in depreciation allowances for 1934, 1935, and 1936.' The
Treasury, however, recommended that the desired results be obtained by
administrative action, rather than legislative action. Secretary of the Treas-
ury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., in a letter to the Ways and Means Committee,
stated that the desired reduction in depreciation deductions could be ob-
tained: first, by requiring the taxpayer to provide a detailed depreciation
schedule, which previously had been prepared by the Bureau; secondly, by
expressly limiting depreciation deductions to the amount reasonably neces-
sary to recover the cost of the property over the useful life of the property;
and, thirdly, by placing the burden of sustaining the amount of the deduction
upon the taxpayer. 65 Congress agreed to allow the Treasury to proceed by
administrative action66 and as a result Treasury Decision 442267 was promul-
gated. 68 Because the burden of establishing reasonableness was shifted to
the taxpayer, 69 the Bulletin F standardized lives enjoyed a presumption of
validity and grew in importance. In 1942 Bulletin F was again revised and
useful life estimates for approximately 5,000 assets were provided. 70 Thus,
as a result of Treasury Decision 4222 and Bulletin F, government involve-
ment in depreciation practice became more extensive and comprehensive.
Another change to depreciation for tax purposes occurred in 1932. The
Revenue Act of 193271 addressed the interplay of the depreciation deduction
and the adjusted basis of depreciable property. Prior to 1932 the adjusted
basis of the depreciable property was reduced by the amount of depreciation
"allowable" 72 as opposed to the amount actually allowed. The allowable
amount was used to prevent the taxpayer from claiming depreciation deduc-
tions only in years of high income. 73 Otherwise taxpayers would ignore
depreciation for years in which they would derive no tax benefit and save
the depreciation for a year when a tax benefit would be realized. This ability
to control the timing of depreciation was inconsistent with the theory of
63. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
64. H.R. 7835, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); see H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1934). The increase in tax revenues would have been $65,000,000, or 11% of business tax
liabilities. See Announcement 71-76, 1971-2 C.B. 503, 505.
65. Letter from the Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, in H.R.
REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1934).
66. Id. at 9; S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
67. XIII-1 C.B. 58 (1934).
68. The legislative activity preceding T.D. 4422 and the arbitrary reduction in allowable
depreciation outraged many taxpayers. It was viewed as an unwarranted abuse of administra-
tive authority. See Barlow, Depreciation, in 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 827, 831 (Comm. Print 1959).
69. T.D. 4422, XIII-1 C.B. 58, 58-59 (1934). See also Mim. 4170, XIII-l C.B. 59(1934), for
information required to be provided by the taxpayer.
70. TAX FOUNDATION, INC., RESEARCH PUB. 24, DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES 19 (1970).
71. Ch. 209, § 113(b)(l)(B), 47 Stat. 169, 201.
72. See generally 40 COLUM. L. REV. 540, 543-44 (1940).
73. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 202(b)(2), 44 Stat. 9, 12.
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depreciation as a uniform, regular device of expensing the cost of the
property .74
A problem arose, however, in instances where taxpayers had claimed
excessive depreciation in years closed by the statute of limitations. The
taxpayer not only received the full benefit of the excessive depreciation, but
would argue that the adjusted basis should be reduced only by the allowable
amount, not the larger amount improperly allowed.7 5 To mitigate that abuse,
the Revenue Act of 1932 amended the adjusted basis provision so that the
cost of the property was reduced by depreciation "to the extent allowed (but
not less than the amount allowable)." ,76 Thus, if the taxpayer claimed exces-
sive depreciation, the adjusted basis of the property would be reduced by
the entire amount allowed, not merely the amount properly allowable. That
provision did not directly prohibit the taking of excessive depreciation, but it
prevented the government from being whipsawed by the taxpayer when the
adjusted basis was in issue. 7
The onset of United States involvement in World War I led to legislative
adjustments to the concept of depreciation for federal income tax pur-
poses. 78 Legislation in 1940 permitted corporations an accelerated five-year
amortization period, in lieu of useful life depreciation, for property con-
sidered necessary for the national defense. 79 This favored treatment was
available with respect to property for which a "certificate of necessity" had
been obtained. The Revenue Act of 194280 extended similar favorable treat-
ment to unincorporated businesses. Such legislation was the first of many
times Congress enacted a special depreciation rule which departed from the
theoretical basis of useful life. 81 The advantage of such accelerated depreci-
ation is now referred to as deferral. Excessive depreciation was taken during
the five-year amortization period, with the result that taxable income and
tax liability were reduced. After expiration of the five-year period, no
further depreciation deductions were allowed and taxable income and tax
liability were increased. Thus, the five-year amortization rule only affected
the timing of the deductions; consequently the payment of taxes was post-
poned, or deferred, rather than forgiven. This deferral of tax liability,
however, was the functional equivalent of an interest-free loan from the
government because no interest charge or other penalty resulted.
74. Id. To force such regular depreciation, the law before 1932 provided that the adjusted
basis in the depreciable property would be reduced by the amount allowable, even if no
depreciation was taken or allowed. See Sakaba Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 370 (5th
Cir. 1934).
75. S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 29 (1931).
76. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 113(b)(1)(B), 47 Stat. 169, 201.
77. This basis provision was upheld by the Supreme Court in Virginia Hotel Corp. v.
Helvering, 319 U.S. 523 (1943).
78. Pyle, Depreciation-Accounting Concept or Political Tool?, 48 MANAGEMENT Ac-
COUNTING 49 (1967).
79. Second Revenue Act of 1940, ch. 757, § 302, 54 Stat. 974, 998.
80. Ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798.
81. Significantly, this legislation manifested the willingness of Congress to alter deprecia-
tion for reasons independent of tax policy. Clearly, in a time of world war, favorable tax
treatment to support the national defense was considered a compelling justification for depart-
ing from tax theory. Modifying depreciation to satisfy other non-tax considerations, however,
has created considerable complexity with respect to depreciation, and, in the opinion of some,
has created unfairness by generating horizontal and vertical inequities. See text accompanying
notes 362-67 infra. A similar amortization provision was enacted during the Korean War.
Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 814, 64 Stat. 906.
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Prior to 1946 most depreciation was computed according to the straight
line method and the Bureau had indicated a preference for that method. 82 In
1946, however, I.T. 3818 authorized the use of the declining balance method
so long as it generated reasonable depreciation allowances and properly
reflected net income.83 Unfortunately, the Bureau failed to provide
guidelines as to reasonable rates to be utilized under the declining balance
method.
By 1953 substantial unhappiness had surfaced with respect to Bureau
depreciation policy.' Friction had been generated over depreciation
methods and Bulletin F useful lives. Taxpayers were complaining that the
Bureau was demanding depreciation methods which were too slow and
useful lives which were too long. As a result, the Bureau adopted a new
policy designed to reduce controversies between taxpayers and the Bureau.
In Revenue Ruling 9085 the Bureau adopted the policy which continues
today86 that taxpayer depreciation amounts would not be challenged unless
there was "a clear and convincing basis" for a change.
The change in Bureau policy, however, was not sufficient to prevent
further statutory modification of depreciation.87 Adoption of the Internal
Revenue Code of 195488 brought statutory approval of accelerated deprecia-
tion methods.89 Declining balance method depreciation at a rate not exceed-
ing 200% of straight line was authorized, as was the sum of the years digits
method. 90 The basic statutory standard was a "reasonable" allowance for
depreciation, and the two accelerated methods would be deemed reasonable
if used in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the Treasury. The
justifications for the accelerated methods were diverse. One concern was to
avoid administrative disputes over allowances. 9' This concern also resulted
in the enactment of section 167(d) 92 in 1954 which authorized binding agree-
ments between taxpayers and the Service as to useful life and rate of
depreciation. A provision in the House bill 93 would have provided a ten
82. In the Bulletin F of 1931 the Bureau approved straight line depreciation and the units of
production method. It stated that other methods, including the declining balance method, had
not been approved in their entirety. U.S. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, BULL. "F" 13 (rev. ed. 1931). See also U.S. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, BULL. "F" 4-5 (rev. ed. 1942).
83. I.T. 3818, 1946-2 C.B. 42, modifying I.T. 2369, VI-2 C.B. 63 (1927). I.T. 2369 had held
that the Bureau would neither approve nor disapprove use of the declining balance method of
depreciation prior to audit.
84. See generally L. KIMMEL, TAXES AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 47 (1950); S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 26, 28, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621; H.R.
REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017.
85. 1953-1 C.B. 43. See also Rev. Rul. 91, 1953-1 C.B. 44.
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-I(b).
87. Indeed, the change in service policy was largely unsuccessful in limiting administrative
disputes over depreciation. See text accompanying notes 109-116, 189-193 infra.
88. Pub. L. No. 591, 68A Stat. 3.
89. I.R.C. § 167(b).
90. Accelerated depreciation was restricted to tangible property with a useful life of three
years or more constructed or acquired after 1953. I.R.C. § 167(c). For general discussion of the
declining balance and sum of the years digits methods of depreciation, see [1973] 62-2d TAX
MNGM'T (BNA) A-28 to -35.
91. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4017, 4047; see S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 26, 28, reprinted in [1954] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4658-59.
92. I.R.C. § 167(d).
93. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
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percent tolerance on useful life estimates, so that the Service would not
have been able to challenge a taxpayer's estimate unless it differed by more
than ten percent from the Service's estimate. 94 The provision, however, was
deleted by the Senate Finance Committee which indicated that the goal of
assuring flexible administrative policy had been achieved by Revenue Rul-
ing 90. 91 Congress clearly was concerned about the administrative problems
associated with depreciation, and the revised deduction provision manifest-
ed that concern.
Another asserted justification for accelerated depreciation methods was
that actual, economic depreciation occurred in a pattern more closely re-
sembling accelerated methods than the straight line method.96 Economic
depreciation is defined as the decrease in value of the property during the
measuring period.97 There is a considerable amount of authority indicating
that economic depreciation occurs in larger amounts during the early years
of use of certain property. 98 To reflect net income for the period more
accurately, the depreciation deduction should approximate economic depre-
ciation. The reports of both the House99 and Senate"° embrace the notion
that accelerated depreciation methods would lead to more accurate reflec-
tions of income for federal tax purposes.
A third justification for accelerated depreciation was that it would serve
as a stimulus to greater economic activity. 01 This justification is significant
from the perspective of tax policy, for unlike the other claimed justifications
for accelerated depreciation, the economic stimulus justification was not
94. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4017, 4099.
95. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4621, 4658-59. See also text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
96. See generally S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26, reprinted in [1954] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4657-58; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted
in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4048.
97. Coen, Investment Behavior, The Measurement of Depreciation, and Tax Policy, 65 AM.
ECON. REV. 59, 59 (1975).
98. See, e.g., J. RYAN, CURRENT DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES 15 (1963); G. TERBORGH,
REALISTIC DEPRECIATION POLICY 37-38 (1954); Davidson, Accelerated Depreciation, in 2 HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG. IST SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 807, 808
(Comm. Print 1959). But see Taubman & Rasche, Subsidies, Tax Law, and Real Estate
Investment, in 3 JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 92D CONG., 2D SESS., THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL
SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 343, 343 (Joint Comm. Print 1972). See also text accompanying notes 318-29
infra.
99. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4017, 4047.
100. S. REP. No. 162, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4621, 4656.
101. The House report states:
More liberal depreciation allowances are anticipated to have far-reaching eco-
nomic effects. The incentives resulting from the changes are well timed to help
maintain the present high level of investment in plant and equipment. The acceler-
ation in the speed of the tax-free recovery of costs is of critical importance in the
decision of management to incur risk. The faster write off would increase avail-
able working capital and materially aid growing businesses in the financing of
their expansion. For all segments of the American economy, liberalized deprecia-
tion policies should assist modernization and expansion of industrial capacity,
with resulting economic growth, increased production, and a higher standard of
living.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4017, 4048. See also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4021. 4656.
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alleged to improve the administration or accuracy of the system, it was
alleged to improve the economy and society as a whole." °2 Thus, the door
had been opened to external policy justifications for depreciation policy.°0 3
The Technical Amendments Act of 19581' introduced section 179 addi-
tional first-year depreciation into the Code. Section 179 allowed extra, or
"bonus," depreciation of twenty percent of cost, with a dollar limitation on
the amount of cost subject to the provision.0 5 The effect of section 179 was
to accelerate depreciation deductions without increasing the total amount
deductible. 16 Section 179 was part of title II, the "Small Business Tax
Revision Act of 1958," of the Technical Amendments Act, which also
contained a number of other provisions benefiting small business. 0 7 Clearly,
the thrust of title II was to provide favored tax treatment for small busi-
nesses and presented another situation where policy considerations, not
directly germane to the revenue generating function of the tax system,
induced Congress to provide a special depreciation rule. 0 8
In 1962 Revenue Procedure 62-21 brought a major change in depreciation
policy.'°9 Prior to the Revenue Procedure, Bulletin F contained useful life
estimates for thousands of items of property. The Bulletin F useful lives,
however, generated animosity in the business community"0 and administra-
tive difficulty for the Service."' Therefore, Bulletin F was withdrawn and
depreciable property was classified within four major industrial groups:
general business; nonmanufacturing activities; manufacturing; and transpor-
102. The direct effect of accelerated depreciation would be to reduce federal revenues. The
House estimated the revenue loss to be approximately $375,000,000. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4025, 4049-50. If the
economic stimulus is successful in generating increased economic activity and income, the loss
may be offset by the subsequent increase in tax revenue. Id.
103. Following 1954 increasing numbers of similar depreciation provisions appeared in the
Code. See text accompanying notes 347-55 infra.
104. Pub. L. No. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1606.
105. The amount of cost subject to the special treatment was limited to $10,000 for unmar-
ried taxpayers, and $20,000 for married taxpayers filing a joint return. Accordingly, the
maximum § 179 deduction was $2,000 for unmarried taxpayers and $4,000 for married taxpayers
filing a joint return.
106. The statute simply created a larger depreciation deduction in the first year. The § 179
computation was made first, then the § 167 depreciation was determined based on the cost of
the property less the § 179 allowance. I.R.C. § 179(d)(8).
107. Other provisions in the Act benefiting small business included: (I) Pub. L. No. 85-866, §
202, 72 Stat. 1606, 1676 (1958) (codified in I.R.C. § 1244), which provided for ordinary loss
treatment with respect to stock of a small business; (2) Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 203, 72 Stat. 1606,
1678 (1958) (codified in I.R.C. § 172), which provided a liberalized net operating loss carryback;(3) Pub. 'L. No. 85-866, § 205, 72 Stat. 1606, 1680 (1958) (codified in I.R.C. § 535(c)), which
provided an increase in the minimum accumulated earnings credit; and (4) Pub. L. No. 85-866, §
206, 72 Stat. 1606, 1681 (1958) (codified in I.R.C. § 6166), which provided for installment
payments of estate taxes attributable to investments in closely held businesses.
108. Title II was designed to aid and encourage small businesses by increasing the volume of
both external and internal funds available, thus preventing the break up of small businesses.
See 104 CONG. REC. 17,085, 17,090 (1958) (amendment offered by Senator Kerr). This assist-
ance can be attributed to the exalted position of the closely held family business in the United
States.
109. 1962-2 C.B. 418. For a discussion of the Treasury Study preceding adoption of Rev.
Proc. 62-21, see David, Statement Before the Committee on Ways and Means on the ADR
System, in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D CONG., IST SESS., PREPARED STATEMENTS,
PANEL DISCUSSIONS ON TAX REFORM, PANEL No. 3, at I, 33 (Comm. Print 1973).
110. W. HOGAN, DEPRECIATION POLICIES AND RESULTANT PROBLEMS 9 (Studies in Industrial
Economics No. 8, 1967); TAX FOUNDATION, INC., RESEARCH PUB. No. 24, DEPRECIATION
ALLOWANCES 19 (1970).
I1l. See generally Announcement 71-76, 1971-2 C.B. 503,504-08.
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tation, communications, and public utilities. Within each of the four major
groups, there were from five to thirty classes of depreciable property. Each
class was composed of functionally related property and for each class a
"guideline life" was provided to be used in computing depreciation, in lieu
of useful life. Thus, Revenue Procedure 62-21 abandoned the item-by-item
useful life approach of Bulletin F, and adopted a more general guideline
class life approach. If the useful life actually used by the taxpayer equalled
or exceeded the guideline life, then the depreciation would not be challeng-
ed. If the useful life chosen by the taxpayer was less than the guideline life,
the depreciation was subject to challenge.
Not only did Revenue Procedure 62-21 provide for simplification with
respect to depreciation, it also provided a substantial concession to taxpay-
ers. The guideline lives were thirty to forty percent shorter, on average, than
the useful lives in Bulletin F,112 and it was estimated that seventy to eighty
percent of all taxpayers had been using tax lives longer than the 1962
guideline lives."'3 A concession of that magnitude is significant and indicates
that either the earlier Bulletin F guidelines were substantially inaccurate or
that the Service intended to move away from using realistic useful lives in
determining depreciation. The Service clearly wanted to reduce the adminis-
trative disputes over useful life.' 4 One way to avoid such disputes was to be
very generous in setting the guideline lives. A more important indication,
however, that the guideline lives intentionally departed from true useful
lives was President Kennedy's discussion of the $1.5 billion revenue loss
associated with the new system. 5 He described it as an affirmative stimulus
to new investment which in increased tax revenues might ultimately repay
the initial tax losses. By characterizing it as a special stimulus, he tacitly
conceded that it was inconsistent with the theoretical concept of deprecia-
tion based upon useful life." 6
An important component of the guideline life depreciation method of
Revenue Procedure 62-21 was the reserve ratio test, which was intended to
test whether the actual retirement and replacement practices of the taxpayer
were consistent with the guideline life being used for depreciation pur-
poses." 7 The reserve ratio computations were rather demanding," 8 but the
result of the computation was to require a lengthening of the guideline life
when a retirement and replacement pattern was longer than the guideline life
used for purposes of depreciation." 19 Essentially, the reserve ratio test
112. Id. at 507.
113. R. POLLOCK, TAX DEPRECIATION AND THE NEED FOR THE RESERVE RATIO TEST 6 (Dep't
of the Treasury Tax Policy Research Study No. 2, 1968).
114. Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 C.B. 418, 429.
115. Statement by President John F. Kennedy on Depreciation Guidelines and Rules (July
II, 1962), cited in Announcement 71-76, 1971-2 C.B. 503, 507.
116. Id.
117. Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 C.B. 418, 435. For a general discussion of the reserve ratio
test, see R. POLLOCK, TAX DEPRECIATION AND THE NEED FOR THE RESERVE RATIO TEST 3-4
(Dep't of the Treasury Tax Policy Research Study No. 2, 1968).
118. See generally Morris, The Reserve Ratio Test, 22 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 481
(1964). The reserve ratio was the accumulated depreciation expressed as a percent of the gross
(undepreciated) bases of the assets within the class. See R. POLLOCK, TAX DEPRECIATION AND
THE NEED FOR THE RESERVE RATIO TEST 3 (Dep't of the Treasury Tax Policy Research Study
No. 2, 1968).
119. The reserve ratio limits were computed to allow actual usage for a period of up to 20%
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sought to conform actual service life with the life period used for deprecia-
tion purposes.
Revenue Procedure 62-21 provided a three-year transitional exemption
from the reserve ratio test. 20 Even so, there was considerable reluctance to
adopt guideline life depreciation by taxpayers, due to the cost of conversion,
the complexity of the reserve ratio test, and the fear of not satisfying the
reserve ratio test.' 21 Although the guideline lives provided up to a forty
percent decrease in useful life for depreciation purposes, the reserve ratio
test had the effect of obligating taxpayers to retire property within that same
period, even though the property might still be serviceable, in order to
preserve the benefits of the shorter guideline lives. Not surprisingly, taxpay-
ers argued for abolition of the reserve ratio test with retention of the short
guideline lives.1
22
From a tax policy perspective elimination of the reserve ratio test is
difficult to support. 123 Requiring substantial identity between the life used
for depreciation and the actual service life is logically consistent 124 and
reasonable. The reserve ratio test, after some transitional problems, was not
as complicated as its opponents alleged 125 and its abandonment raised sub-
stantial questions with respect to horizontal and vertical equity. 12 6 Assume,
for example, that taxpayer A utilized the guideline life for depreciation
purposes and satisfied the reserve ratio test by retiring the property within
the guideline period. Contrast taxpayer B who utilized the guideline life for
depreciation purposes, but failed to satisfy the reserve ratio test because the
property was still productive at the end of the guideline life. Absent the
reserve ratio test, both taxpayers would be treated the same with respect to
depreciation deductions. That result is inequitable, however, because tax-
payer B's extended use of the property demonstrated that a longer depreci-
able life with lower annual deductions was appropriate.
The controversy over the reserve ratio test continued and Revenue Proce-
longer than the class life, or 10% shorter than the class life. Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 C.B. 418,
470-71.
120. An additional transition rule was provided that allowed the taxpayer to avoid applica-
tion of the rule for a period equal to the guideline life if the reserve ratio each year was
declining. Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 C.B. 418, 436. This was referred to as the "trending" rule.
121. Announcement 71-76, 1971-2 C.B. 503, 511-12; TAX FOUNDATION, INC., RESEARCH PUB.
No. 24, DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES 24 (1970).
122. See, e.g., G. TERBORGH, THE FADING BOOM IN CORPORATE TAX DEPRECIATION 12-13
(1965); PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION, BUSINESS TAXATION 3, 20 (1970).
123. The proposals to eliminate the test generated considerable discussion. See R. POLLOCK,
TAX DEPRECIATION AND THE NEED FOR THE RESERVE RATIO TEST 1-2 (Dep't of the Treasury Tax
Policy Research Study No. 2, 1968); David, Statement Before the Committee on Ways and
Means on the ADR System, in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D CONG., IST SESS.,
PREPARED STATEMENTS, PANEL DISCUSSIONS ON TAX REFORM, PANEL No. 3, at 1, 7-9 (Comm.
Print 1973); How Workable is the Reserve Ratio Test? Here's What the Experts Say, 23 J. TAX.
333 (1965).
124. For an argument that consistency is unnecessary, see How Workable is the Reserve
Ratio Test?Here's What the Experts Say, 23 J. TAX. 333, 334 (1965).
125. Announcement 71-76, 1971-2 C.B. 503, 512 n.45; see How Workable is the Reserve
Ratio Test?Here's What the Experts Say, 23 J. TAX. 333, 333 (1965).
126. R. POLLOCK, TAX DEPRECIATIONS AND THE NEED FOR THE RESERVE RATIO TEST vi
(Dep't of the Treasury Tax Policy Research Study No. 2, 1%8); TAX FOUNDATION, INC.,
RESEARCH PUB. No. 24, DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES 24-25 (1970). Horizontal equity means that
taxpayers with the same amount of income should pay the same amount in taxes. Vertical
equity means that taxpayers with greater income should pay a greater amount in taxes.
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dure 62-21127 was supplemented by Revenue Procedure 65-13. Revenue
Procedure 65-13 provided an additional method by which to measure
compliance with the reserve ratio test.2 8 It also provided another transi-
tional rule to mitigate the immediate consequences of the test and a minimal
adjustment rule to minimize the change in the guideline life where the
reserve ratio test was not satisfied. The additional transition rule was an
attempt to phase in the effect of the test slowly. The transition period was
equal to the guideline life of the property, and taxpayers were given a fifteen
percent additional allowance with respect to the reserve ratio analysis. 129
The fifteen percent additional allowance was eliminated over the term of the
transition period. The minimal adjustment rule provided that if the reserve
ratio test required an increase in the guideline life, the increase in any year
could not exceed ten percent of the guideline life. 130
Even after Revenue Procedure 65-13, the reserve ratio test was criticized.
It was argued that the test did not work well with new, or "green," guideline
class accounts because violation of the test could not be determined until the
end of the ownership cycle. 13' Another problem was treatment of stand-by
property which had been fully depreciated, but was retained and used only
in unusual circumstances. Inclusion of such property in the guideline class
could cause failure of the reserve ratio test. 132 The criticism that the reserve
test was too complex continued and was supported by a survey of experi-
enced IRS agents indicating that eighty-seven percent of the agents found
the test unworkable and impractical. 133
The adoption of the additional transition rule in 1965 delayed effective-
ness of the reserve ratio test until 1971 when the transition rules were
beginning to phase out. The reserve ratio test, however, was never really
given a chance to function because asset depreciation range depreciation
was adopted in 1971 ,3' and that method of depreciation did not include a
reserve ratio test. In 1972 Revenue Procedure 62-21 and the reserve ratio
test were revoked by the Service. 35
In addition to Revenue Procedure 62-21, the year 1962 brought several
other changes to depreciation for federal income tax purposes. One of the
changes was the addition of section 167(f) 3 6 which entered the Code via the
Revenue Act of 1962. Section 167(f) provided that the taxpayer could
disregard for salvage value purposes up to ten percent of the cost of
depreciable property. Thus, if gross salvage value was ten percent of the
cost of the property, or less, salvage value could be ignored in determining
127. 1962-2 C.B. 418.
128. Rev. Proc. 62-21 compliance was determined by reference to tables and was termed the
"tabular" form of the reserve ratio test. 1962-2 C.B. 418, 439-59. Rev. Proc. 65-13 compliance
was measured by a direct mathematical computation (supplemented by an "annual factor") and
was termed the "guideline" form of the reserve ratio test. 1965-1 C.B. 759, 760-65.
129. Rev. Proc. 65-13, 1965-1 C.B. 759, 767.
130. Id. at 768.
131. Announcement 71-76, 1971-2 C.B. 503, 511.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 512.
134. See text accompanying notes 183-200 infra.
135. Rev. Proc. 72-10, 1972-1 C.B. 721, 731.
136. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 13(c)(1), 76 Stat. 960, 1034 (codified at
I.R.C. § 167(f)).
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depreciation. If gross salvage value was in excess of ten percent of the cost
of the property, only the excess was utilized as salvage value in determining
depreciation.' 37 By ignoring part or all of the salvage value, the total amount
depreciable was increased. Upon disposition of the fully depreciated proper-
ty, however, a gain would be realized because the salvage value would
exceed the adjusted basis of zero. Thus, the consequence of section 167(f)
was deferral of income taxes. The purpose of section 167(f) was to eliminate
speculative salvage value estimates where there would be little residual
value. 138
The Revenue Act of 1962 also introduced the section 1245 recapture
provisions. 39 Adoption of the depreciation recapture provisions was an
extremely significant event in the development of tax depreciation policy.
Since section 1231 14 provides, in effect, long term capital gain treatment for
gains realized from sales of depreciable property, it creates a special prob-
lem with respect to the depreciation allowance. Annual depreciation is a
deduction from ordinary income, and the amount deducted reduces the
taxpayer's basis in the property. Upon disposition, if the depreciation de-
ductions taken have been greater than the actual decline in the value of the
property, capital gain is realized to the extent the value of the property
exceeds its adjusted basis. The effect is that the taxpayer has received prior
deductions from ordinary income and realizes a capital gain at the time of
sale. From the perspective of tax policy, it is anomalous that the taxpayer
could receive capital gain treatment on the sale of business assets, the costs
of which have been deducted against ordinary income. This conversion of
ordinary income to capital gain was aggravated by the use of accelerated
depreciation methods. Section 1245 addressed this anomaly by providing
that prescribed amounts of the gain recognized upon disposition of depreci-
able personal property would be recharacterized, or "recaptured," as ordi-
nary income.' 4
1
Mechanically, section 1245 was fairly straightforward. It required the
137. Salvage value is utilized in computing the annual depreciation deductions under the
straight line and sum of the years digits methods of depreciation. Treas. Reg. §§ l.167(b)-i(a)
-3(a)(1) (1%2). Salvage value is not so used in determining declining balance method deprecia-
tion. Treas. Reg. § l.167(b)-2(a) (1962).
138. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1962) (stating that the elimination of
excessive depreciation deductions prevents the conversion of ordinary income into capital
gains in the depreciation context).
139. I.R.C. § 1245.
140. Id. § 1231.
141. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67 (1962). Real property was excluded
from § 1245. A reason advanced for excluding real property from § 1245 was that "this
treatment presents problems when there is an appreciable rise in the value of real property
attributable to a rise in the general price level over a long period." H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1962). The meaning of that phrase is not at all clear. Apparently, Congress
was concerned that real property was held for longer periods of time than personalty and that
recapture should not apply where the price level had been rising. That is a somewhat disingenu-
ous analysis for several reasons. First of all, our tax structure generally ignores rising price
levels. Moreover, owners of personalty as well as owners of realty experience the conse-
quences of inflation. Providing special treatment for rising prices only to owners of real
property seems unfair. Another curiosity of the exception for realty is that a holding period
device could have been drafted which would apply to both realty and personalty. The exception
for realty may have been more a manifestation of the political strength of the real estate
industry than it was an indication that realty was somehow incompatible with the recapture
notion.
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recapture as ordinary income of the lesser of gain recognized 42 or post-1961
depreciation deductions taken. If depreciation accurately reflected decline
in economic value, the adjusted basis and fair market value would be equal
so that upon disposition there would be no gain and, accordingly, no recap-
ture. Recapture occurred only if the property was depreciated more rapidly
than its decline in value. It is ironic that Congress adopted section 1245 to
deal with depreciation that was too rapid while at the same time adopting
section 167(f) which increased the depreciation which could be taken. 143
Even more striking was the inconsistency between section 1245 and the
substantial reduction in useful lives and consequential acceleration of depre-
ciation granted earlier in the year by Revenue Procedure 62-21.1"4
The method that Congress chose to deal with the conversion problem is
noteworthy for its indirectness. The direct solution to the problem would
have been to decelerate depreciation deductions by limiting the accelerated
methods or lengthening useful lives. Instead, Congress chose a device which
operated at the end of the ownership cycle. The consequence of this indirect
approach was to require the taxpayer to account for the excess depreciation
upon disposition, rather than during ownership of the property. Thus, the
taxpayer was allowed the tax deduction attributable to excess depreciation,
but the excess had to be repaid, as ordinary income, at the end of the
ownership cycle. The taxpayer did not achieve conversion, but did obtain
the benefit of deferring taxes on the excess depreciation until disposition of
the property. Because of the deferral advantage, there was still an induce-
ment to accelerate depreciation.
The Revenue Act of 1964145 extended the recapture principle to real
property by introducing section 1250 into the Code. Although section 1250
appeared on its face to be similar to section 1245, the differences were
substantial. Section 1245 generally recaptured the lesser of gain recognized
or the post-1961 depreciation. Section 1250 applied only to post-1963 depre-
ciation taken in excess of straight line depreciation. 146 Thus, the scope of
section 1250 was considerably narrower than that of section 1245. In addi-
tion, section 1250 phased out over time; if the property was held for a
sufficient length of time, there was no recapture. This was accomplished by
utilizing an "applicable percentage" device. The applicable percentage, 100
percent less one percent per month for each month the property was held in
excess of twenty months, was multiplied by the lesser of the gain recognized
or the post-1963 depreciation in excess of straight line depreciation. Thus,
after 120 months there was no recapture. In summary, the significant differ-
ences between section 1245 and section 1250 were that section 1250 applied
only to depreciation in excess of straight line while section 1245 applied to
all depreciation, and section 1250 phased out over time while section 1245
did not.
142. I.R.C. § 1245.
143. A major goal of § 167(f), no doubt, was to reduce administrative problems over salvage
value. That consideration alone might well justify the provision.
144. 1962-2 C.B. 418.
145. Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19.
146. If the property was disposed of within one year of acquisition, the recapture applied to
all depreciation taken, not just the excess of actual depreciation over straight line.
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Purportedly, Congress was concerned about the effect of inflation on
recapture computations when it considered extending recapture to realty. It
was argued that gain attributable to inflation was fundamentally different
from gain attributable to excessive depreciation, and that gain attributable to
inflation should be exempted from recapture. The problem became one of
drafting a recapture provision which would exempt inflation gains. The
provision would have been complex and Congress chose, instead, to attempt
to approximate the inflation gain by exempting straight line depreciation and
by phasing out the recapture over time. The House Report justifies the
special treatment, as follows:
Your committee generally has limited the depreciation recapture to the
excess over straight line depreciation because it believes that only to
this extent could the depreciation taken appropriately be considered in
excess of the decline in the value of the property which occurs over
time. If a gain still occurs, it is believed that this is attributable to a rise
in price levels generally rather than to an absence of a decline in the
value of the property. The portion representing the rise in value is
comparable to other forms of gains which quite generally are treated as
capital gains. Moreover, your committee believes that when the proper-
ty is held for an extended period of time, gains realized on the sale or
other disposition of the property are more likely to be attributable to
price rises generally than to an excess of depreciation deductions. For
that reason, your committee's bill also tapers off over a 10-year period
the proportion of the additional depreciation (or gain where smaller)
which is to be treated as ordinary income upon the sale of the proper-
ty. 147
As a matter of logic, that explanation makes very little sense. Section 1245
was triggered whenever depreciation deductions taken exceeded the actual
decline in value. Section 1250, however, was triggered only if depreciation
in excess of straight line exceeded the actual decline in value. In other
words, an amount equal to straight line depreciation was unequivocally
exempted from the section 1250 recapture rules. Mechanically allowing an
amount equal to straight line depreciation to escape recapture, on the pre-
text that such an amount equals a price level increase which should not be
recaptured, is not only bad policy, but bad reasoning. It is bad policy
because no other type of income is protected from inflation and fairness
demands uniform treatment of all taxpayers.148 Real property owners should
not be protected from inflation if no one else is. The analysis represents bad
reasoning in automatically equating yearly price level increases with the
amount of straight line depreciation. It is obvious that the two are not
necessarily related. Congress was unable to quantify the inflation amount
accurately, so it arbitrarily exempted straight line depreciation from recap-
ture.
The phase-out of recapture over time was a corollary of the exemption of
straight line depreciation from section 1250. Both provisions were intended
147. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 102-03 (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1411. The Senate Report contains virtually identical language. S. REP. No.
830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 133, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1806-07.
148. See text accompanying notes 362-67 infra.
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to protect depreciable real property from the combined effects of inflation
and recapture. The rationale behind the phase-out rule was that the longer
the property was held, the greater the proportion of the gain attributable to
inflation. Thus, it was argued, to offset and exclude that inflation gain, the
recapture provision should be fully effective at first, but phase out over
time. Obviously, the phase-out was an imprecise device for compensating
for inflation, but Congress chose not to adopt a more precise and more
complex inflation adjustment. 49
The final element in the pre-1969 development of depreciation for federal
income tax purposes came in 1966 with the adoption of section 167(i), 50
which precluded use of accelerated depreciation methods for real property
acquired during a "suspension period" which was imposed from October
10, 1966, until March 9, 1967. Section 167(i) was, in economists' jargon, a
counter-cyclical fiscal policy tool enacted in an attempt to decelerate an
inflationary economy."'5 As originally enacted, the suspension period was to
terminate on December 31, 1967, but in March 1967, less than four months
after actual enactment, the President requested and Congress approved an
immediate termination of the suspension period. 52 The short life of the
suspension period was significant in demonstrating how politicized depreci-
ation policy had become. Depreciation was not viewed by Congress as a
fixed and immutable component of the Internal Revenue Code, but as a
temporal concept subject to the economic and social pressures of the mo-
ment. The short existence of section 167(i) indicated how quickly those
pressures can shift. Depreciation was no longer a staid concept.
II. CONTEMPORARY DEPRECIATION
A. Tax Shelters and the Tax Reform Act of 1969
The Tax Reform Act of 1969"' brought numerous substantive changes to
the Code, many of which were directed at tax shelter abuses. An examina-
tion of the tax shelter problem must begin with Crane v. Commissioner.
54
Crane involved a taxpayer who had received by bequest improved realty
subject to a mortgage of approximately $255,000, plus unpaid interest of
149. From technical and tax policy viewpoints, the exceptions to § 1250 make little sense.
The exceptions undoubtedly attest to the political power of the organized real estate industry.
Real property depreciation recapture issues probably created different political alliances than
did personal property recapture. A plausible explanation for the less rigorous provisions of §
1250 is that Congress may well have desired to continue to stimulate the real estate industry so
as to encourage the construction of housing.
150. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, § 2, 80 Stat. 1508, 1513.
151. See S. REP. No. 1724, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4337-38. "The proposal is basically an anti-inflationary measure designed to
relieve the pressures, clearly observable in the money markets and capital goods sector, which
are producing unusual strains, the highest interest rates in 40 years, and a perceptible trend
toward a general condition of economic instability." President's Proposal on Suspension of the
Investment Credit and Application of Accelerated Depreciation: Hearings on H.R. 17607Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966) (statement of Secretary
of the Treasury Fowler).
152. Congress subsequently terminated the suspension period effective Mar. 10, 1967. Act
of June 13, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-26, 8-1 Stat. 57.
153. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
154. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). See generally Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane
Doctrine; An Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REV. 159 (1966).
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approximately $7,000. The taxpayer was not personally liable on the encum-
brance. The property had been appraised at a value equal to the total amount
of the debt, $262,000. While owning the property, the taxpayer had used
$262,000 as the depreciable basis. The taxpayer subsequently sold the prop-
erty for $2,500 cash, subject to the $255,000 mortgage.
The Supreme Court held that the amount realized by the taxpayer in-
cluded both the cash received from the buyer and the amount of the mort-
gage to which the property was subject. If under Crane mortgage indebted-
ness was included in the amount realized when property was sold, the
unavoidable implication was that a purchase money mortgage must also be
reflected in the adjusted basis. Accordingly, Parker v. Delaney'55 held that a
purchase money mortgage is to be included in the adjusted basis; hence,
depreciation deductions are based on gross value, not net equity. Deprecia-
tion based on gross value applies even if the owner is not personally liable
for the indebtedness; the Court concluded that the owner would act to
protect the equity in the property regardless of personal liability. 56 Thus,
the effect of Crane and Parker is to treat the taxpayer as 100 percent owner
of property purchased with one percent equity and ninety-nine percent
indebtedness, even if the indebtedness is nonrecourse.157 The direct tax
consequences are that with a relatively small investment the taxpayer can
benefit from 100 percent of the deductions the property generates. The
Crane rule that gross value, not net equity, is the depreciable basis is
logically correct from the perspective of tax policy. To hold that net equity
is the depreciable basis would generate considerable computational difficul-
ty158 and would allow the taxpayer to control the timing of the depreciation
deductions.159 Nevertheless, by allowing the taxpayer depreciation deduc-
tions based on properties acquired through nonrecourse financing, Crane
became a foundation for tax shelters. With the introduction of accelerated
depreciation, an entire tax shelter industry was built on this foundation.16°
In 1954, the accelerated methods of depreciation were touted as being
more reflective of actual decline in value. 161 Taxpayers discovered, how-
ever, that accelerated depreciation exceeded actual decline in value in the
early years of use of the property. 162 The importance of accelerated depreci-
ation was the fact that it could be used to create a tax loss with respect to the
property in the early years which could be applied against the taxpayer's
155. 186 F.2d 455 (Ist Cir. 1950).
156. This was premised on the assumption that the taxpayer had some net equity in the
property. If there was no net equity, the taxpayer who was not personally liable would not act
to preserve the property. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 n.37 (1947). Seealso Millar v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656 (1977).
157. The only qualification is that the indebtedness be bona fide and the amount thereof
must be determinable. Manuel D. Meyerson, 47 T.C. 340, 350-53,(1966).
158. As the indebtedness was paid down, the net equity would rise. Depreciation would be
based on the increased net equity.
159. The taxpayer would have discretion to increase or decrease depreciation deductions by
increasing or decreasing the net equity through manipulating the indebtedness.
160. See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., I
TAX REVISION ISSUES-1976 (H.R. 10612) 3-22 (Comm. Print 1976).
161. See text accompanying notes 87-103 supra.
162. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 86 (1975). See text accompanying notes 318-29
infra for a discussion of the empirical evidence.
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other income. Although the tax loss in the early years would be offset by
taxable income in the later years, the taxpayer postponed payment of taxes
until the later period. The advantage obtained was deferral.' 63 This deferral
advantage could be increased by highly leveraging the property so as to
maximize the tax loss in the early years. Promoters found the limited
partnership to be the ideal tax shelter investment vehicle because it provided
for centralized management, losses were passed through the entity to the
limited partner, and the limited partner's liability could not exceed his
contribution. 164 The combination of Crane, accelerated depreciation, and
the limited partnership created tax shelters which were used extensively by
high income taxpayers. 65 The abuse was particularly severe in the case of
depreciation on real property improvements because accelerated deprecia-
tion substantially exceeded actual decline in value." Thus, real estate
provided a particularly attractive tax shelter investment.167
Given this development of tax shelter abuse, Congress acted in 1969 to
minimize, but not remove, the benefits of investing in tax shelters. In the
Tax Reform Act of 19691' the excessive depreciation problem was ad-
dressed both indirectly and directly. 69 Indirect remedies were the introduc-
tion of a minimum tax on tax preferences and the tightening of section 1250.
The direct remedy was a new restriction contained in section 167(j) on
accelerated depreciation for real property.
The minimum tax 170 was intended to impose a tax, though admittedly
small, 171 on items which were entitled to favored treatment under the Code.
Due to the existence of those "preferences" many taxpayers with large
economic incomes paid little or no income taxes. 172 Two of the enumerated
preference items were based on accelerated depreciation: the excess of
accelerated depreciation on realty over straight line, and the excess of
accelerated depreciation over straight line with respect to personal property
subject to a "net" lease. 173
163. Some tax shelters sought not only deferral but also conversion of ordinary income into
capital gain. See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TNT. REV. TAX., 94TH CONG., 2D
SESS., I TAX REVISION ISSUES-1976 (H.R. 10612) 3-22 (Comm. Print 1976).
164. See generally Perry, Limited Partnerships and Tax Shelters: The Crane Rule Goes
Public, 27 TAX L. REV. 525 (1972).
165. See generally Corman, The Use and Misuse of Tax Shelters: The Congress and Tax
Reforms, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 509 (1974).
166. See H.R. REP. No. 413 (PART 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (1969), and text accompany-
ing notes 318-29 infra.
167. See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., I
TAX REVISION ISSUES-1976 (H.R. 10612) 25-32 (Comm. Print 1976).
168. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
169. See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TNT. REV. TAX., 91ST CONG., 2D SESS.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1969, at 181 (1970). See also S. REP. No.
552, 91ST CONG., IST SESS. 212 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 413 (PART 1), 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 165
(1969).
170. I.R.C. §§ 56-58.
171. The tax rate was only 10% and there were substantial exemptions. The tax rate was
increased and the exemptions reduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §
301, 90 Stat. 1520, 1549-54. See text accompanying notes 204-17 infra.
172. A significant factor in the adoption of the 1969 reforms was a Treasury report which
disclosed that 154 returns with adjusted gross income of $200,000 or more in 1966 resulted in the
payment of no income tax. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TNT. REV. TAX., 91ST CONG., 2D
SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT of 1969, at 105 (1970).
173. For an explanation of the net lease requirement, see id. at 106.
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The tightening of section 1250 was accomplished by modifying the appli-
cable percentage phase-out rule; the exemption from recapture of straight
line depreciation was not changed. The phase-out rule was modified as to
post-1969 additional depreciation by deleting the phase-out period and gen-
erally substituting 100 percent as the qualified percentage.174 This change
complicated the statute because two layers of depreciation recapture now
existed: the post-1969 layer, and the post-1963/pre-1970 layer. The two
separate layers were required in order to allow the differing applicable
percentage provisions to operate. The statute prescribed that the more
stringent post-1969 layer be applied first, and if there was any remaining gain
not recaptured under the post-1969 layer, then the post-1963/pre-1970 layer
would be applied. The computations required were not overpowering, but
the language of the statute became rather convoluted.
These indirect methods of resolving the excessive depreciation problem
were only partially successful. The minimum tax proved to be a toothless
tiger, due to its low tax rate and its generous exemptions. 175 The elimination
of the recapture phase-out was a move in the proper direction, but the
continued exemption for straight line depreciation left a large gap in the
section 1250 recapture provisions.
The direct method of dealing with the problem of excessive depreciation
was contained in section 167(j) which restricted the availability of ac-
celerated depreciation on real property. Section 167(j) generally provided
that new real property improvements could be depreciated at a rate no faster
than the 150 percent declining balance method and used real property
generally was restricted to straight line depreciation. 176 New property was
favored over used property, presumably on economic stimulus grounds.
Congress wanted to restrict excessive depreciation, while retaining an in-
ducement for the construction and purchase of new real property. 177
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 also contained a number of special deprecia-
tion provisions. The section 1250 applicable percentage rules provided spe-
cial dispensation for residential real property. Although the general rule of
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was to eliminate the phase-out by prescribing
100 percent as the applicable percentage, for residential real property the
phase-out principle was retained and the period was lengthened. The old rule
provided for a phase-out period of between twenty and 120 months, while
the new rule for residential real property provided for a phase-out period of
between 100 and 200 months. In the case of government assisted low-income
housing, the twenty-month to 120-month rule was preserved. New residen-
174. The 100% applicable percentage rule did not apply to residential real property. See text
following note 177 infra.
175. The original estimate of revenue to be generated by the minimum tax on individuals for
1972 and thereafter was $285,000,000. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., 91ST
CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 20 (1970). The
actual revenue generated for 1974 was $130,000,000. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 109
(1976).
176. Once again, however, more generous provisions were made for residential rental
properties. See text accompanying note 178 infra.
177. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 166, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1645, 1819.
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tial rental property also was provided special treatment under section 167(j),
which allowed the use of either the 200 percent declining balance method of
depreciation or the sum of the years digits method; 178 used residential rental
property was entitled to the 125 percent declining balance method of depre-
ciation. 179
The pattern in the statute clearly indicated several policy decisions by
Congress. Residential property was given substantial relief from the more
stringent rules because Congress, although concerned about excessive de-
preciation, was also concerned with housing problems. 8' The special dis-
pensations given to residential realty indicated that Congress was willing to
forgo in part substantive tax reform in order to solve other societal prob-
lems. The more favored treatment for new property as compared to used
property indicated the desire of Congress to stimulate greater economic
activity through construction of new properties.'
Various other depreciation provisions were part of the Tax Reform Act of
1969. Rehabilitation expenditures for low-income rental housing, pollution
control facilities, railroad rolling stock, and coal mine safety equipment
were provided sixty-month amortization periods. 82 These amortization
periods were totally unrelated to actual useful lives; their sole purpose was
to facilitate certain desirable investment practices.
The consequence of the 1969 legislation was a further politicization of
depreciation. Originally, depreciation had been a relatively simple,
straightforward method of allocating the cost of property over its useful life.
After the Tax Reform Act of 1969, depreciation and recapture were rather
complicated and the statute contained a number of nonconforming provi-
sions for favored kinds of property or favored activities.
B. ADR Depreciation and the Revenue Act of 1971
One of the most significant and controversial changes to depreciation
came in 1971 with the introduction of asset depreciation range (ADR) depre-
ciation. ADR depreciation originally was promulgated by administrative
action,'83 and was subsequently codified as "class life" asset depreciation
range depreciation in section 167(m). The major purpose of ADR deprecia-
tion was to provide additional leeway in determining the useful life of
depreciable property. 181 ADR depreciation was elective and gave the taxpay-
er a range of useful lives from which to select. The range extended from a
useful life of twenty percent in excess of the 1962 guideline lives to a useful
life of twenty percent less than the 1962 guideline lives. The system operated
178. I.R.C. § 167(j)(2).
179. Id. § 167()(5).
180. H.R. REP. No. 413 (PART 1), 91st Cong., ist Sess. 166, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1819.
181. Id.
182. I.R.C. § 167(k); § 169; id. § 184; id. § 187 (repealed 1976).
183. T.D. 7128, 1971-2 C.B. 132. See generally Bittker, Treasury Authority to Issue the
Proposed "Asset Depreciation Range System" Regulations, 49 TAXES 265 (1971). See also
Announcement 71-76, 1971-2 C.B. 503, 517-21.
184. See Rev. Proc. 72-10, 1972-1 C.B. 721, 721. Rev. Proc. 77-10, 1977-12 I.R.B. 4, has




by grouping assets acquired in the same year into vintage accounts.185 There
was no reserve ratio test.
The background to ADR depreciation provides insight as to the nature of
the final legislation. Congress had repealed the investment credit in 1969,
because the economy was over-heated and no longer needed a stimulus. "6 In
addition, accelerated depreciation had been restricted in 1969. The business
community did not support either of these actions. As the economy began to
soften in 1970 and 1971, the business community began to press for tax
reductions as economic stimulus devices. Several members of Congress
inquired as to the adequacy of depreciation allowances and the Treasury
responded by providing an analysis of the economic consequences of vari-
ous depreciation reforms.18 7 On January 11, 1971, the President proposed
Treasury adoption of ADR depreciation.' 88 Eventually ADR depreciation
was codified and the investment credit was reenacted by Congress.
Three primary justifications were asserted for adoption of ADR deprecia-
tion: it would promote administrative ease; it would provide a more accurate
determination of taxable income; and it would generate increased economic
activity. 89 With respect to the administrative ease justification, the Treas-
ury argued that it was continually plagued by disputes over useful life. 190
Although Revenue Procedure 62-21 had provided a thirty to forty percent
reduction in the useful lives in Bulletin F, 191 the Treasury argued that
another twenty percent reduction would further minimize disputes. The
1962 guidelines had not been revised and the Treasury argued that they had
become outdated. 92 The administrative ease argument was appealing, but
not compelling. Carried to its logical extreme, taxpayers would be given
absolute control over useful life determinations because there would be no
disputes. Moreover, taxpayer control over depreciation had been the policy
in the early years of tax depreciation, and it had been abandoned because it
led to unrealistically short useful lives. 193
The second justification for the twenty percent ADR useful life reduction
was that it would lead to more accurate depreciation allowances and there-
fore more accurately reflect net income. 194 The argument was that the thirty
to forty percent reduction in useful lives in Revenue Procedure 62-21 had
not kept pace with changing technology which generated rapid obsolesc-
ence. Although the 1960's certainly was a period of great technological
advancement, evidence indicated that useful lives were not too long. The
existence of the recapture provisions was evidence that excessive deprecia-
185. For a discussion of the mechanics of the class life ADR system, see R. FEINSCHREIBER,
TAX DEPRECIATION UNDER THE CLASS LIFE ADR SYSTEM (1975).
186. See H. REP. No. 413 (PART 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 178-79 (1969).
187. In response to an inquiry from Senator Javits, the Treasury prepared a report entitled
Tax Depreciation Policy Options: Measures of Effectiveness and Estimated Revenue Losses.
See 116 CONG. REC. 25,684 (1970).
188. Emory, The Corman and Mills-Mansfield Bills: A Look at Some Major Tax Reform
Issues, 29 TAX. L. REV. 3, 49-50 (1973).
189. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ASSET DEPRECIATION RANGE (ADR) SYSTEM 239-60 (1971).
190. Id. at 240-51.
191. See text accompanying notes 109-22 supra.
192. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ASSET DEPRECIATION RANGE (ADR) SYSTEM 215 (1971).
193. See text accompanying notes 56-70 supra.
194. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ASSET DEPRECIATION RANGE (ADR) SYSTEM 247-48 (1971).
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tion, rather than insufficient depreciation, had been taken in the past. 195 The
limited information available under the reserve ratio test of Revenue Proce-
dure 62-21 indicated that most taxpayers were utilizing useful lives which
were shorter than actual replacement practice. 196 Moreover, empirical evi-
dence was beginning to be developed on the useful life question, 197 evidenc-
ing that depreciation was too rapid.
The final purported justification for ADR depreciation was that it would
serve as an economic stimulus to a lagging economy. 198 There was no
substantial dispute that the economy was in a pause, or decline, and that
stimulation as a matter of macroeconomic policy was in order. There was
disagreement, however, as to the propriety and effectiveness of using ADR
depreciation as a fiscal policy tool, and ADR was challenged as an unfair
benefit to big business. 199 Notwithstanding those issues, Congress adopted
ADR depreciation. 200
Finally, another special amortization provision entered the Code in the
Revenue Act of 1971. Section 188201 provided a sixty-month amortization
period, in lieu of useful life, for on-the-job training facilities and child care
facilities acquired by employers. In 1971 the economy was suffering from
the combined effects of a business downturn and high unemployment. °2 To
remedy the high unemployment problem, Congress wanted to improve on-
the-job training facilities. The incentive for child care centers was intended
to aid those persons who could not previously be employed due to child-
rearing responsibilities. 20 3
C. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
From 1971 until 1976 depreciation policy remained essentially unchanged.
By the spring of 1975, however, considerable attention was again focusing
on tax shelter abuses. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 simply had not been
successful in stopping tax shelters. 2°4 Because accelerated depreciation was
a major element in tax shelters, it too came under scrutiny. The Tax Reform
Act of 1976, however, did not directly modify the depreciation deduction.
Instead, the 1976 Act restricted the tax benefits derived from investing in tax
195. See text accompanying notes 139-49 supra. It should be noted that the effects of
inflation have been ignored at this point. Inflation can have a substantial impact on the
determination of gain and recapture. See text accompanying notes 231-84 infra.
196. See TAX FOUNDATION, INC., RESEARCH PUB. No. 24, DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES 24
(1970).
197. See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, AN ANALY-
SIS OF TAX PROVISIONS AFFECTING BUSINESS INVESTMENTS 18-19 (1974); Taubman & Rasche,
Economic and Tax Depreciation of Office Buildings, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 334 (1969). For a
discussion of the most current empirical evidence, see text accompanying notes 318-29 infra.
198. H.R. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1825.
199. G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 59-63 (1975); FEDERAL TAX REFORM
FOR 1976, at 121-26 (S. Surrey, P. McDaniel, & J. Pechman eds. 1976).
200. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 109(a), 85 Stat. 497, 508. The Treasury
Department has restated the ADR system in Rev. Proc. 77-10, 1977-12 I.R.B. 4.
201. I.R.C. § 188.
202. H.R. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 3, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1825-1827.
203. Id. at 45, [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1860.
204. See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., I
TAX REVISION ISSUES-1976 (H.R. 10612) (1976).
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shelters and modified the Crane rule20 5 with respect to nonrecourse
liabilities. 2°6 Under the 1976 Act recourse liabilities for which the taxpayer is
at risk are still within the Crane rule and cause an increase in the investor's
adjusted basis. The statutory "at risk" rules in the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
sections 465 and 704(d), 2 7 operate to limit the investor's allowable losses to
the amount that the taxpayer is at risk.2" Thus, in the case of highly
leveraged shelters using nonrecourse liabilities, the taxpayer's amount at
risk is relatively small and the amount of allowable losses is significantly
curtailed. Losses which are not allowed because of the "at risk" rules are
held in suspense until an additional amount is at risk against which the
suspended losses may be deducted. 2"
The 1976 Act further refined the percentage phase-out provisions in
section 1250.210 Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the applicable percent-
age was 100% except for residential rental property which was phased out
between 100 and 200 months, and low income housing which was phased out
between twenty and 120 months.21' Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976 the
100 percent applicable percentage rule was extended to residential rental
realty other than low income rental housing. For specified low income rental
housing the phase-out period was converted to the 100-to-200 months phase-
out. The effect of the 1976 Act was to add a third layer of depreciation
recapture to section 1250. Separate computations are now required for post-
1963/pre-1970 additional depreciation, post-1969/pre-1976 additional depre-
ciation, and post-1975 additional depreciation. Although tightening the re-
capture provisions is sound tax policy, piecemeal reform has unnecessarily
complicated the statute. The 1976 Act also extended for two years the sixty-
month amortization period for rehabilitation expenditures on low-income
rental housing and raised the amount eligible for special treatment from
$15,000 to $20,000.212
Another significant tax shelter provision contained in the 1976 Act sub-
stantially broadened the minimum tax on tax preferences. The 1969 version
of the minimum tax had proved to be ;neffective in preventing tax shelter
abuse2"3 because the original exceptions were too generous and the tax rate
was too low. The 1976 Act increased the tax rate from ten percent to fifteen
percent, reduced the exempt amount, and modified the items of tax prefer-
ence. In particular, accelerated depreciation on all leased personal property
was subjected to the minimum tax, whereas before the 1976 Act only
accelerated depreciation on personal property subject to a "net" lease was
subject to the tax.
Another attack on tax shelter abuses contained within the 1976 Act was
205. See text accompanying notes 154-59 supra.
206. I.R.C. §§ 465, 704(d).
207. Id.
208. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 33 (1976).
209. Id. at 36.
210. I.R.C. § 1250(a)(I).
211. See text accompanying notes 174-79 supra.
212. I.R.C. § 167(k).
213. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 33 (1976).
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the modification of additional first-year depreciation in section 179. In the
past, the dollar limitations of section 179 applied to each partner individu-
ally. Consequently, each partner could take up to $4,000 of additional first-
year depreciation. The 1976 Act severely curtails the tax shelter benefit of
section 179 by applying the dollar limitation to the partnership level, rather
than to the individual partners. Accordingly, only one additional first-year
depreciation allowance may be taken.
The 1976 Act also contained several specialized depreciation provisions.
Section 190 allows immediate expensing of costs incurred in removing
architectural and transportation barriers to handicapped or elderly per-
sons.2 14 Absent section 190, such expenditures would have to be capitalized
and depreciated. With the addition of section 191, certain rehabilitation
expenditures for certified historic structures215 may be amortized over a
sixty-month period, and under section 167(o) a taxpayer who substantially
rehabilitates a certified historic structure may elect to be treated as if the
original use of the property commenced with the taxpayer. 216 Thus, such a
taxpayer has the option of electing a sixty-month amortization under section
191, or accelerated depreciation under section 167(o).27 Finally, section
167(n) provides that only straight line depreciation is available for property
constructed or used on a site which previously was occupied by a certified
historic structure which was demolished or substantially altered.
D. Theoretical Bases for Contemporary Depreciation
In retrospect, depreciation has come a long way. What started as a
relatively simple accounting convention has become a complex statutory
concept. Early statutory versions of depreciation were quite succinct,
whereas the various contemporary depreciation provisions are lengthy and
complex. Originally depreciation was viewed as a fact of tax life, while now
considerable tax planning activity is focused on the depreciation and recap-
ture consequences of proposed transactions. In sum, depreciation is a radi-
cally different concept now than it was originally. The theoretical underpin-
nings remain fundamentally unchanged, but the concept is considerably
more complex.
One manifestation of the current complexity in the depreciation concept is
the multitude of formulations attempting to define depreciation. Diverse
formulations have developed in both financial and tax accounting, attribut-
able to conceptual distinctions. Perhaps the simplest and most theoretically
accurate definition of depreciation is the excess of the value of the property
at the start of a period over the value of the property at the end of the
period.21 8 Ultimately, depreciation seeks to allocate the cost of long life
214. I.R.C. § 190(c) provides a maximum dollar limitation of $25,000 per year.
215. Certified historic structures include depreciable buildings and structures which are
listed in the National Register or are located in an historical district and are certified to be of
historic significance. I.R.C. § 191(d)(1).
216. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 643-45 (1976).
217. The rate would be 200% declining balance or 150% declining balance under § 167(j),
depending on whether the property is residential rental, or not.
218. Haugh & Keenan Storage & Transfer Co. v. Heiner, 20 F.2d 921, 923 (W.D. Pa. 1927);
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property over the period the property is consumed. The cost properly
attributable to any period is most accurately reflected by the actual decline
in value of the property during that period. Unfortunately, because of
intrinsic valuation problems actual decline in value cannot be used for
financial accounting or tax purposes.
An alternative view of depreciation is that the depreciation charge repre-
sents a fund from which replacement property may be purchased. 219 Histor-
ically, this formulation can be attributed to accountants' use of the title
"reserve for depreciation" for the accumulated depreciation account. 220 In
financial accounting, the word "reserve" connoted a special account from
which corporate distributions could not be made.22 Thus, the title "reserve
for depreciation" suggested that the reserve represented a fund which could
be used only to purchase new property. Early Treasury regulations 2 2 adopt-
ed this theory, and it is still manifest in Treasury Regulation § 1. 167(a)-I(a).
Numerous cases have also adopted the replacement fund theory, among
them City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co. 223 and United States v.
Ludley. 224
A third formulation of depreciation is that of a mechanical allocation
device whereby the net cost of the depreciable property is spread over the
useful life of the property. 2 5 Thus, depreciation is viewed as a means of
matching the expenses of production with the revenues received. Without
depreciation, the cost of long life property would not be considered in the
determination of net income. Depreciation is recognized as a somewhat
arbitrary device due to its mechanical allocation, but such a mechanical
allocation is mandated due to the difficulties encountered in determining
actual decline in value. 22 6 Under this theory, depreciation is viewed as a
device by which to determine more accurately the net income of the enter-
prise. Financial accounting has adopted this version of depreciation. 27
Still another formulation of depreciation is that it is a method whereby the
taxpayer "recovers" the acquisition cost of the property. 228 The rationale
for this formulation is that the taxpayer should be allowed to reacquire, free
Coen, Investment Behavior, The Measurement of Depreciation, and Tax Policy, 65 AM. ECON.
REV. 59, 59-60 (1975).
219. W. HOGAN, DEPRECIATION POLICIES AND RESULTANT PROBLEMS 2-3 (Studies in Industri-
al Economics No. 8, 1967); J. RYAN, CURRENT DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES 11-14 (Studies in
Industrial Economics No. 5, n.d.); Note, Inflation and the Federal Income Tax, 82 YALE L.J.
716, 720 (1973).
220. See Paton, Significance of Depreciation Accounting with Special Reference to Plant
Replacement, in SUBCOMM. ON TAX POLICY, JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84TH
CONG., IST SESS., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 528, 529-31
(Joint Comm. Print 1955).
221. H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING 107-08 (6th ed. 1965).
222. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 161, T.D. 2831 (1918).
223. 212 U.S. I, 13-14 (1909).
224. 274 U.S. 295, 300-02 (1927).
225. A. MURRAY, DEPRECIATION 1-2 (Harvard Law School Tax Technique Handbook 1971).
226. Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 275-77 (1966).
227. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 33,
RESTATEMENT AND REVISION OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS, ch. 9, § C(5) (1953).
228. See Commissioner v. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., 350 F.2d 580, 581 (7th Cir. 1965);
Reisinger v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 475, 477-78 (2d Cir. 1944); Occidental Loan Co. v. United
States, 235 F. Supp. 519, 524 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
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of tax, an amount equal to the original cost.22 9 To compensate for the fact
that the taxpayer was allowed no immediate tax benefit at the time of
acquisition, a tax benefit is allowed over the useful life of the property.
The significant theoretical differences between the foregoing formula-
tions of the depreciation concept have generated considerable confusion
with respect to the nature of depreciation. 230 The confusion persists today
and the various theories are manifest in depreciation reform proposals
which reflect significantly different perceptions of the nature of deprecia-
tion.
E. Purposes of Contemporary Depreciation
Present depreciation provisions manifest numerous purposes. Although
the primary purpose of depreciation is the allocation of the cost of the
property over its useful life, clearly tax depreciation is used to encourage
taxpayers to purchase depreciable property, to induce certain investment
activities deemed socially desirable, and to regulate the economy. Converse-
ly, many contemporary depreciation provisions have been enacted to pro-
hibit excessive depreciation. Finally, a goal of depreciation policy has been
to minimize administrative disputes over the amounts and timing of depreci-
ation deductions. On reflection, the goals have often been short sighted and
inconsistent. Certainly, depreciation is being asked to do a great deal, and
the ever expanding scope of its use has distorted the concept.
III. MODIFICATION PROPOSALS
A. Inflation Adjusted Depreciation
In an attempt to remedy the existing confusion about depreciation, vari-
ous proposals to modify depreciation have been offered. The vice or virtue
of the proposals no doubt depends on one's interpretation of the correct
purpose of depreciation. Some proposals represent mere extensions or
modifications of the previously discussed formulations of depreciation.
Other proposals represent more radical departures from traditional notions.
Probably the most discussed proposal for modification of depreciation is an
inflation adjustment.
Substantial and continued inflation has been a contemporary plague to the
world's mature industrial economies. 231 Significant inflation occurred in
the United States during the 1960's, and since 1970 inflation has risen
229. The Second Circuit stated this formulation as follows: "The purpose of the statute
allowing deductions for depreciation is to permit the taxpayer currently to receive income tax-
free to the extent that wear and tear and time decrease the value of his investment, or what is
treated as his investment, in the property." Reisinger v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 475, 477-78
(2d Cir. 1944).
230. Paton, Significance of Depreciation Accounting with Special Reference to Plant Re-
placement, in SuBcoMM. ON TAX POLICY, JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84TH CONG.,
IST SESS., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 528, 529 (Joint Comm.
Print 1955).
231. See generally Davidson & Weil, Inflation Accounting: Implications of the FASB Pro-
posal, in INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX 81 (H. Aaron ed. 1976); Furstenburg, Corporate
Taxes and Financing Under Continuing Inflation, in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE STUDIES
ON CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 225 (W. Fellner ed. 1976).
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sharply.2 12 Due to the presence of such inflation, it has been argued that
depreciation deductions should be adjusted to account for the effects of the
inflation.2 33 The argument has been articulated on the theories that deprecia-
tion is a device to determine net income more accurately and that deprecia-
tion is the source of replacement funds. It is argued that inflation has had the
effect of causing under-depreciation with respect to both theories. Under
the accurate determination of net income theory of depreciation it is argued
that the dollars of depreciation based on historical cost are not comparable
to current dollars because of inflation.234 Current dollars are overstated
because they are relatively less valuable than historical, noninflated dollars.
Accordingly, it is argued that it is erroneous to combine current dollars with
historical dollars in determining net income against which to apply the
income tax 235 because depreciation is understated and net income is over-
stated. Arguably, historical dollars should be increased by an inflation
adjustment so as to make the depreciation deduction dollars equal in value
to current dollars. By so adjusting for inflation, dollars would become
constant and net income would be more accurately determined.
With respect to the replacement reserve fund theory of depreciation, it is
argued that historical cost depreciation will not create a fund which is
sufficient to purchase replacement property.2 36 The replacement fund theory
is not concerned with the comparability of the dollars utilized in determining
net income for the period; it is concerned with the ability of the replacement
fund to purchase replacement property at current prices.
An extension of the theoretical differences in inflation adjusted deprecia-
232. Table I. Statistical Measures of United States Inflation, 1950-1975
Average Annual Rate of Price Change:
Consumer Wholesale Fixed Investment
Year Price Index Price Index GNP Deflator Deflator
1950-55 2.15 1.43 2.60 2.78
1955-60 2.04 1.57 2.40 2.10
1960-65 1.27 0.36 1.59 0.52
1965-70 4.24 2.71 4.21 4.30
1970-75 6.75 9.64 6.71 7.80
1973-74 10.97 18.86 9.71 10.94
1974-75 9.14 9.24 7.87 12.76
H. GALPER & J. MENDENHALL, REPORT ON U.S. EXPERIENCE ON INFLATION AND THE TAX
STRUCTURE 2 (Office of Tax Analysis Paper 19 Revised, Dep't of the Treasury 1977).
233. See generally G. WELSCH, C. ZLATKOVICH, & J. WHITE, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING
1066-67 (4th ed. 1976); Simon Introduction, in THE FINANCIAL CONFERENCE ON INFLATION 7
(Sept. 20, 1974).
234. G. TERBORGH, REALISTIC DEPRECIATION POLICY 113-22 (1954); Spacek, Phantom-
Profits as Seen by an Accountant, in DEPRECIATION AND TAXES 70, 75-77 (1959); 1 Tax Reform:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. I, 23-26 (1975)
(statement of William E. Simon).
235. S. DAVIDSON, C. STICKNEY, & R. WEIL INFLATION ACCOUNTING 2 (1976).
236. W. HOGAN, DEPRECIATION POLICIES AND RESULTANT PROBLEMS 113-15 (Studies in
Industrial Economics No. 8, 1967); Hogan, Depreciation Reform, in 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., IST SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 925, 927-28 (Comm. Print
1959); Terbogh, Tax Depreciation, in id. at 857, 865-66.
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tion is manifest in the selection of the device by which to account for the
consequences of inflation. Two standards which have been suggested are
based on current fair market value and general price level adjusted historical
CoSt.23 7 The current value standard would recompute depreciation on the
basis of the current value of the depreciable property. 238 It would apply item
by item and would seek to determine depreciation according to current
replacement cost.239 By reference to replacement cost, the current value
standard conceptually is an extension of the replacement fund theory of
depreciation. Conversely, general price level adjusted depreciation is an
extension of the accurate determination of income theory of depreciation. 240
This method seeks to equate current and historical dollars by applying an
inflation index to historical dollars. Thus, units of equal value would be
utilized in determining net income and in making intertemporal numerical
comparisons.
Financial Accounting. The organized accounting profession has struggled
for some time with the problems of changing price levels.24' Originally, when
inflation was less acute than it has been recently, the accounting profession
ignored the consequences of inflation. 242 Agitation for change persisted,
however, and in 1969 the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
published a nonbinding policy statement which concluded that general price
level adjusted financial statements would present useful information to
statement readers. 243 A significant step was taken by the organized account-
ing profession in 1974 when it considered the adoption of a rule which would
have required as supplementary information the presentation of various
items, including depreciation, in units of general purchasing power. 2" The
proposal generated considerable disagreement, however, and eventually
was withdrawn. The disagreement over the proposal centered not on the
need for inflation adjustments, but whether to use a general price level
method or a current value method.2 45
237. See generally G. WELSCH, C. ZLATKOVICH, & J. WHITE, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING
1062-88 (4th ed. 1976).
238. See 2 Tax Reform: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 1208, 1210-12 (1975) (statement of Ray M. Stroupe); TOUCHE Ross & CO., CURRENT-
VALUE ACCOUNTING, ECONOMIC REALITY IN FINANCIAL REPORTING (1976).
239. Current value depreciation may also use various other measurement devices such as
reproduction cost, net realization value, discounted cash flow value, specific price index
adjusted value, and appraisal value. See G. WELSCH, C. ZLATKOVICH, & J. WHITE, INTER-
MEDIATE ACCOUNTING 1087-88 (4th ed. 1976).
240. See generally ERNST& ERNST, ACCOUNTING UNDER INFLATIONARY CONDITIONS (1976);
ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO., OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
22-23 (1972); Stott, Capital Recovery in a World of Inflation, 34 TAX REV. 5 (1973).
241. See generally ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING PROBLEMS OF
THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 10-16 (5th ed. 1976).
242. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 33,
RESTATEMENT AND REVISION OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS, ch. 9, § A (1953).
243. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNT-
ANTS, STATEMENT No. 3, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS RESTATED FOR GENERAL PRICE-LEVEL
CHANGES, para. 25-49 (1969).
244. See ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING PROBLEMS OF THE AC-
COUNTING PROFESSION 13-14 (5th ed. 1976).
245. TOUCHE Ross & Co., CURRENT-VALUE ACCOUNTING, ECONOMIC REALITY IN FINANCIAL
REPORTING 6 (1976). In the context of international accounting, where the inflation rates of
some countries are many multiples of other countries, the international accounting organiza-
tions have been successful in adopting advisory rules which urge the disclosure of the effects of
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Recently, considerable attention has been given to inflation adjusted
accounting required by the Securities and Exchange Commission.2 46 In a
series of releases, the SEC adopted amendments to Regulation S-X requir-
ing disclosure of certain financial data regarding current replacement CoSt. 247
Footnote disclosure of the effects of inflation on depreciation and other
items must be made on quarterly 10-K reports, while only a more general-
ized disclosure is required in year-end statements. Presumably such disclo-
sure is for the benefit of more sophisticated investors who go to the trouble
of reading the quarterly 10-K reports.
The SEC rules have adopted the current value standard of replacement
cost, rather than the general price level standard. 241 The stated objective of
the SEC rule is "to give investors information about the current economics
of business operations" so that they may "measure the cost of maintaining
the operating capability or productive capacity of the entity." 24 9 It seems
inherent in the adoption of the replacement cost standard that the SEC
views depreciation as a replacement fund from which to purchase new
property. If one of the goals of financial reporting is to disclose the cost of
maintaining operating capacity, then the function of depreciation is to
charge off an amount equal to the replacement cost of the depreciable
property consumed during the period.
Adoption of the SEC rules has not been met with great enthusiasm. The
accounting profession remains split on the issue of current value-or general
price level adjustments. 20 The publicly traded corporations which have
been required to file the replacement cost information have been quite vocal
in expressing their displeasure with the higher replacement cost depreciation
expenses.251 The reduction in net income, for public reporting purposes, is
particularly distasteful to management. It is claimed that the replacement
cost figures are unrealistic and misleading. 252
Federal Income Tax. Although the business world has been displeased with
inflation adjusted depreciation for public reporting purposes, there has been
inflation. See DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA) No. 106, June 1, 1977, at G-l.
246. See generally Phillips, Tax Incentives of Accounting for Inflation, 7 TAX ADVISER 465(1976).
247. SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5608, Replacement Cost Data: Proposal to
Require Disclosure, 40 Fed. Reg. 40,550 (1975); SEC Accounting Series Release No. 190,
Amendment to Regulation S-X Requiring Disclosure of Replacement Cost Data, 41 Fed. Reg.
13,596 (1976); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 12, 41 Fed. Reg. 50,814 (1976); SEC Current
Replacement Cost Information, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-17 (1977).
248. SEC Current Replacement Cost Information, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-17 (1977).
249. SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5608, Replacement Cost Data: Proposal to
Require Disclosure, 40 Fed. Reg. 40,550, 40,552 (1975).
250. Compare ERNST & ERNST, ACCOUNTING UNDER INFLATIONARY CONDITIONS (1976) with
TOUCHE Ross & Co., CURRENT-VALUE ACCOUNTING, ECONOMIC REALITY IN FINANCIAL RE-
PORTING (1976).
251. See Brown, Auto Makers Say Depreciation Expenses Differ 49% to 1209% in Two Cost
Methods, Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 1977, at I1, col. I; Pappas, Flaky Figures: Inflation Accounting, In
SEC-Ordered Test, Irks Many Companies, Wall St. J., May 23, 1977, at I, col. 6; Schorr,
Footnote Furor: New Accounting Rule Ordered by the SEC Upsets Many Concerns, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 23, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
252. Perhaps in response to the substantial criticisms, the SEC has solicited comments on




considerable enthusiasm for inflation adjusted depreciation for federal in-
come tax purposes.25 3 This inconsistent position is revealing with respect to
business attitudes towards depreciation.
Proposals have been made to modify tax depreciation by use of replace-
ment cost as the depreciable basis2 54 and by use of a general price level
adjustment to historical cost depreciation. 255 The proponents of replacement
cost models maintain that the most accurate measure of current depreciation
is related to the actual value of depreciable property at the end of the period.
It is argued that the depreciation method should be applied to the replace-
ment cost of the property at the end of the period, not to the historic cost.
For example, assume that in year one the taxpayer purchases depreciable
property for $300,000 and the property has an estimated useful life of three
years. Ignoring salvage value, straight line depreciation for each of the three
years would be $100,000. Assuming that the depreciation deduction creates
a replacement fund, at the end of the three-year period there will be $300,000
with which to replace the fully depreciated property. Under the replacement
fund theory of depreciation, all the numbers appear to be in order. If,
however, the replacement cost of the property increases during the period
the taxpayer depreciates the property, the replacement fund will be inade-
quate. If the cost of replacing the property has risen above $300,000, the
taxpayer will not be able fully to fund the purchase from the replacement
fund. Accordingly, there have been proposals to adjust tax depreciation so
that it will be based on the replacement cost of the property during the
period .256
If the replacement cost of the property did not increase during year one,
the $100,000 annual depreciation would not have to be adjusted. If at the end
of year two, however, the replacement cost had risen to $400,000, the year
two replacement cost depreciation would be determined by multiplying the
annual depreciation rate (1/3) times the replacement cost of the property
($400,000). Thus, the depreciation for year two would be $133,333. If during
year three the replacement cost of the property had risen to $600,000, the
year three depreciation under the replacement cost method would be
$200,000. It should be noted, however, that the foregoing replacement cost
depreciation method is not fully satisfactory. The sum of the three annual
replacement cost depreciation amounts, $433,333, is still less than the actual
replacement cost at the end of year three, $600,000.
253. N. TURE, ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1954-60, at 10 (1967);
Harriss, Capital Recovery and the Investment Tax Credit, in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 93D CONG., IST SESS., PREPARED STATEMENTS, PANEL DISCUSSIONS ON TAX REFORM,
PANEL No. 3, at 351-52 (Comm. Print 1973); 2 Tax Increase Proposals: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 534-40 (1974); TAX FOUNDATION, INC., RE-
SEARCH PUB. No. 24, DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES 38-43 (1970).
254. R. COEN, DEPRECIATION, PROFITS, AND RATES OF RETURN IN MANUFACTURING INDUS-
TRIES 26 (Office of Tax Analysis Paper 3, Dep't of the Treasury 1975); Cohen, Proposals for
Depreciation Reform, in DEPRECIATION AND TAXES 209, 209-25 (1956); TOUCHE ROSS & Co.,
CURRENT-VALUE ACCOUNTING, ECONOMIC REALITY IN FINANCIAL REPORTING 5-8 (1976).
255. G. TERBORGH, REALISTIC DEPRECIATION POLICY 8-10 (1954); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAX., 95TH CONG., I ST SESS., TAX POLICY AND CAPITAL FORMATION 22-23 (1977); DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 65 (1977).
256. See authorities cited in note 254 supra.
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In order to have total accumulated depreciation equal the replacement
cost at the end of the useful life of the property, two steps would have to be
performed each year. 257 The first step would be to determine current depre-
ciation according to current replacement cost of the property, as was done in
the foregoing example. The second step would be to adjust the depreciation
from previous years. The depreciation taken in previous years was correct
when taken, but it would have to be further adjusted in subsequent years if
the accumulated depreciation is to equal replacement cost of the property at
the end of the useful life. Year three replacement cost depreciation would
need no further adjustment because it was based on current replacement
cost. Year two replacement cost depreciation would need one adjustment to
account for the increase in replacement cost which occurred during year
three. Year one replacement cost depreciation would need two adjustments;
one to account for the increase in replacement cost which occurred during
year two, and one to account for the increase in replacement cost which
occurred during year three. The adjustments would be as follows:
YEAR YEAR YEAR
ONE TWO THREE
Current year replacement cost depreciation:
Year one: 1/3 ($300,000) $100,000
Year two: 1/3 ($400,000) $133,333
Year three: 1/3 ($600,000) $200,000
Adjustment to year one depreciation
due to increase in replacement cost
in year two (33 1/3%2 8 x $100,000) 33,333 0 0
Adjustment to year one depreciation due to
increase in replacement cost in year
three (50%259 x $133,333) 66,667 0 0
Adjustment to year two depreciation
due to increase in replacement cost
in year three (50% x $133,333) 0 66,667 0
Total depreciation taken each year $200,000 $200,000 $200,000
Total depreciation $600,000
The mechanics of reporting the adjustment to prior years' depreciation
deductions attributable to subsequent increases in replacement cost would
present problems. One way to report the adjustment would be to amend the
257. See generally R. COEN, DEPRECIATION, PROFITS, AND RATES OF RETURN IN MANUFAC-
TURING INDUSTRIES (Office of Tax Analysis Paper 3, Dep't of the Treasury 1975); TOUCHE Ross
& Co., CURRENT-VALUE ACCOUNTING, ECONOMIC REALITY IN FINANCIAL REPORTING (1976).
258. The adjustment percentage attributable to year two is equal to a fraction, the numerator
of which is the excess of the year two replacement cost over the year one acquisition cost, and




259. The adjustment percentage attributable to year three is equal to a fraction, the
numerator of which is the excess of the year three replacement cost over the year two





prior period return, but that is impractical for long life property because of
the statute of limitations. 26° The alternative with respect to such adjustments
attributable to prior periods would be to allow an additional deduction
during the current year to compensate for previously inadequate replace-
ment cost depreciation. 26' Under this alternative, the current year deprecia-
tion deductions would be as follows:
YEAR YEAR YEAR
ONE TWO THREE
Current year replacement cost depreciation $100,000 $133,333 $200,000
Year two adjustment to year one depreci-
ation due to increase in replacement
cost of property in year two 0 33,333 0
Year three adjustment to year one depre-
ciation due to increase in replacement
cost of property in year three 0 0 66,667
Year three adjustment to year two depreci-
ation due to increase in replacement
cost of property in year three 0 0 66,667
Total depreciation taken each year $100,000 $166,667 $333,333
Total depreciation $600,000
There are several objections to this kind of replacement cost depreciation.
First, as a matter of fiscal policy it would be destabilizing. 262 During periods
of inflation, when fiscal controls should have the effect of restraining the
economy, this kind of replacement cost depreciation would have the oppo-
site effect. The larger depreciation deductions caused by increased replace-
ment costs during inflation would result in lower taxable income and lower
tax liability to the government. During times of inflation, tax liabilities
should increase rather than decrease. Thus, this kind of replacement cost
depreciation would be pro-cyclical rather than counter-cyclical as a matter
of fiscal policy. 263
A more serious objection to replacement cost depreciation is the ever-
present problem of valuation. Annual determinations of replacement cost
would be required and administrative problems abound wherever valuation
is involved. Although strongly supported by many in principle, replacement
cost depreciation is not a practical alternative for federal income tax pur-
poses because of the administrative difficulties associated with annual valu-
ations of property. 264
260. I.R.C. § 6511.
261. See Discussion of Depreciation and Changing Price Level, in DEPRECIATION AND TAXES
102, 120-21 (1959); 2 Tax Increase Proposals: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 538-39 (1974).
262. R. COEN, DEPRECIATION, PROFITS, AND RATES OF RETURN IN MANUFACTURING INDUS-
TRIES 16-17 (Office of Tax Analysis Paper 3, Dep't of the Treasury 1975); A. MURRAY,
DEPRECIATION 27-28 (1971).
263. R. COEN, DEPRECIATION, PROFITS, 'AND RATES OF RETURN IN MANUFACTURING INDUS-
TRIES 16-17 (Office of Tax Analysis Paper 3, Department of the Treasury 1975); A. MURRAY,
DEPRECIATION 27-28 (1971). It should be noted that present law depreciation is destabilizing, but
to a much more limited degree than the replacement cost proposal.
264. But see TOUCHE Ross & Co., CURRENT-VALUE ACCOUNTING, ECONOMIC REALITY IN
FINANCIAL REPORTING 6 (1976).
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General price level adjusted depreciation is the other method of adjusting
depreciation for inflation. 6 ' By utilizing a published government price level
index, 26 rather than replacement cost, the administrative difficulties would
be reduced significantly. In lieu of redetermining the replacement cost each
year, the historical cost depreciation would be stepped-up by a price level
index each year. General price level adjusted depreciation is related theoret-
ically to the accurate determination of net income theory of depreciation 267
because application of the index converts historical dollars into current
dollars so that all dollars utilized in determining net income are units of equal
value. For example, assume that a taxpayer purchases depreciable property
for $300,000 in year one. The property has an estimated useful life of three
years; therefore, ignoring salvage value, straight line depreciation would be
$100,000 per year. If in year one the taxpayer generates revenues of
$400,000 and incurs other operating expenses of $200,000, net income would
be $100,000. Assuming a fifty percent marginal tax rate,2 68 the tax liability
would be $50,000. If in year two the price level doubles, then nominal sales
would increase to $800,000 and nominal operating expenses would increase
to $400,000, but present law historical cost depreciation would remain at
$100,000, not double to $200,000. As a result, in year two, net income would
be $300,000 and the tax liability would be $150,000. As a result of a doubling
of the price level, the taxpayer's nominal tax liability has tripled rather than
doubled because the depreciation deduction of $100,000 is based on year one
dollars, which have lost half of their value. Due to the incomparability of
historical depreciation dollars and current dollars, it has been proposed that
historical depreciation be increased by an appropriate price level index. By
applying such an index to the foregoing example, historical cost depreciation
of $100,000 would be multiplied by an index of 200 percent with the result
that the year two depreciation would be restated to equal $200,000. The net
income then would be $200,000, rather than $300,000, and the tax liability
would be only $100,000. General price level adjusted depreciation would
result in a tax liability of $100,000, which is twice the year one tax liability of
$50,000. The difference is attributable to the change in price level. Although
nominally greater in year two, the tax liability in constant dollars has not
increased. Because the general price level adjusted method of depreciation
is only concerned with accurately reflecting the results of the current period,
and does not seek to create a replacement fund,2 69 no adjustment is made to
prior depreciation deductions due to price level changes in the current
period.
265. See, e.g., H. GALPER & J. MENDENHALL, REPORT ON U.S. EXPERIENCE ON INFLATION
AND THE TAX STRUCTURE 12-16 (Office of Tax Analysis Paper 19 Revised, Dep't of the Treasury
1977); DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 64-65 (1977); Stott, Capital
Recovery in a World of Inflation, 34 TAX REV. 5 (1973).
266. There are several indices which could be used: the consumer price index, the wholesale
price index, the gross national product deflator, and the fixed investment deflator. See H.
GALPER & J. MENDENHALL, REPORT ON U.S. EXPERIENCE ON INFLATION AND THE TAX STRUC-
TURE 2 (Office of Tax Analysis Paper 19 Revised, Dep't of the Treasury 1977). Discussion of
the relative merits of the various indices is beyond the scope of this Article.
267. See text accompanying notes 225-27 supra.
268. Additionally assume that the taxpayer does not change tax brackets.
269. See text accompanying notes 219-24 supra.
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One element of inflation adjusted depreciation remains to be considered,
and that is the appropriate adjusted basis for purposes of determining the
amount of gain or loss upon disposition. The issue is whether the adjusted
basis should be based on historical cost, or increased to reflect the price
level change. One proposal would determine the adjusted basis by reference
to historical cost reduced by inflation adjusted depreciation. Another pro-
posed method would determine adjusted basis by reference to an inflation
corrected cost basis reduced by inflation adjusted depreciation. A third
alternative would be to use inflation adjusted depreciation for purposes of
determining the depreciation deduction, but use historical cost basis and
historical cost depreciation for purposes of determining gain or loss.2 7
The first method's use of historical cost basis reduced by inflation adjust-
ed depreciation, could lead to a negative adjusted basis because total annual
depreciation deductions might exceed historical cost. 27' The third method,
use of inflation adjusted depreciation for purposes of determining the depre-
ciation deduction, but using historical cost basis reduced by historical cost
depreciation for purposes of determining gain or loss on disposition, is
internally inconsistent. Thus, it appears initially that the correct formulation
of adjusted basis for purposes of determining gain or loss would be the
second method, inflation corrected cost basis reduced by accumulated infla-
tion adjusted depreciation. To test that thesis, assume that depreciable
property was purchased for $30,000 in year one. Ignoring salvage value and
assuming a three-year useful life, straight line depreciation would be $10,000
per year. Assume further that a ten percent increase in the price level occurs
in years two and three and the property is sold at the end of year three for
$5,000. Depreciation amounts would be as follows:





Current Accumulated Indexed Current Accumulated
Depreciation Depreciation at 10% Depreciation Depreciation
Year One $10,000 $10,000 $30,000 $10,000 $10,000
Year Two 10,000 20,000 33,000 11,000 21,000
Year Three 10,000 30,000 36,300 12,100 33,100
Consider next the tax consequences of the disposition of the property at the
end of the year three for $5,000, under each of the alternatives. The
combined consequences of ownership and disposition would be as follows:
270. See ERNST & ERNST, ACCOUNTING UNDER INFLATIONARY CONDITIONS 7-9 (1976).
271. Negative adjusted basis is precluded under present law. See Crane v. Commissioner,
331 U.S. 1, 11 (1946); I S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL, & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 858-59 (1972).
272. Only general price level adjusted depreciation will be utilized in this adjusted basis
analysis because replacement cost depreciation is not a practical depreciation method.
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HISTORICAL COST
DEPRECIATION
(TOTAL DEPRECIA- GENERAL PRICE LEVEL ADJUSTED DEPRECIATION
TION=$30,000) (TOTAL DEPRECIATION =$33,100)
Method One: Method Two: Method Three:
Historical Cost Inflation Corrected Historical Cost
Basis Less Basis Less Basis Less
Inflation Adjusted Inflation Adjusted Historical Cost
Depreciation Depreciation Depreciation
I. Total depreciation taken $30,000 $33,100 $33,100 $33,100
2. Gain (loss) realized upon sale:
a. Amount realized $ 5,000 $ 5,000 $ 5,000 $ 5,000
b. Less: 12/31/3 adjusted basis
(I) costbasis $30,000 $30,0)0 $36,300273 $30,000
(2) less: total depreciation




12/31/3 adjusted basis 0 (3,100) 3,2
Gain (loss) realized $ 5,000 $ 8,100 $ 1,800 $ 5,000
3. Net reduction in income over
useful life
(line I minus line 2) $25,000 $25,000 $31,300 $28,100
The bottom line figures are instructive in determining which basis rule is
most accurate. The present law historical cost method results in a net
decrease in income of $25,000 over the ownership period. Although that
appears reasonable enough considering the $30,000 acquisition cost and
$5,000 amount realized upon disposition, it fails to account for the change in
price level during the intervening years. Therefore, the $25,000 depreciation
deduction is low and overstates income.
With respect to general price level adjusted depreciation, the three
methods reach different results. Method one results in a net decrease in
income of $25,000, the same as present law historical cost depreciation. It
reaches that result by allowing greater depreciation deductions during the
useful life, but causing an offsetting larger gain upon disposition because of
the use of a negative basis. In effect method one is an acceleration device as
it does not allow a larger write-off due to inflation that would occur under
present law. Method two, under which adjusted basis is determined by
computing an inflation corrected acquisition cost reduced by inflation ad-
justed depreciation, results in a net reduction of $31,300. This is an exces-
sive reduction in income because it is equivalent to the deduction resulting
from replacement cost depreciation275 and, as noted above, under general
price level adjusted depreciation, total replacement cost is not deducted.
Method three reaches an equitable result even though based on historical
cost figures. The underlying premise is that the $33,100 in depreciation
deductions taken during the ownership years was appropriate and that the
deductions were of current value dollars in the year taken. Theoretically, a
proper depreciation deduction for each year of the useful life should gener-
ate gain upon sale at the end of the useful life equal to the amount realized
from the sale because accurate depreciation deductions will reduce the
273. Under method two, acquisition cost of $30,000 is stepped up by the inflation index to
$36,300.
274. Even though total depreciation deductions of $33,100 have been taken, under method
three only historical cost depreciation of $30,000 is used to reduce adjusted basis.
275. The deduction computed under the replacement cost method would be $36,300, less the
$5,000 amount realized upon disposition.
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adjusted basis to zero. Accordingly, three years of proper depreciation
should cause a gain of $5,000 when property is disposed of for $5,000. The
$28,100 net reduction in income is theoretically sound, even though method
three appears internally inconsistent in light of its use of both inflation
adjusted and historical cost amounts. The $28,100 figure may also be ob-
tained by grossing-up the historical cost depreciation amounts by the infla-
tion index so that the historical depreciation dollars will be comparable to
the current period sales proceeds of $5,000. The sum of such adjusted
historical depreciation amounts equals $33,100 in current dollars .2 7 6 Reduc-
tion by the $5,000 of gain realized upon disposition equals a $28,100 constant
dollar net reduction in income over the ownership period.
An additional inflation adjusted depreciation proposal is termed "rein-
vestment depreciation." 277 The inflation adjusted depreciation methods dis-
cussed above make current period adjustments to depreciation during the
useful life of the property. Under the reinvestment depreciation method,
inflation adjustments are made at the end of the useful life, rather than
during the useful life. The excess of the inflation adjusted historical cost
over unadjusted historical cost is allowed as an additional depreciation
deduction at the end of the useful life of the depreciable property. The
deduction is limited to the lesser of (1) the excess of (a) the amount reinvest-
ed during the year in depreciable property over (b) the historical cost, not
reduced by accumulated depreciation, of depreciable property sold or aban-
doned during the year, or (2) the greater of (a) the excess of (i) the inflation
adjusted basis of the depreciable property sold or abandoned during the year
over (ii) the historical cost of such property not reduced by accumulated
depreciation, or (b) $50,000.278 In addition, carryforward of the deduction
for two years is allowed. 279
276. The gross up of historical cost depreciation is as follows:
Year one: $10,000(1+.10)2 = $12,100
Year two: $10,000(1 +.10) = 11,000
Year three: $10,000(i) = 10,000
Total Depreciation in Year Three Dollars $33,100
277, See generally W. HOGAN, DEPRECIATION POLICIES AND RESULTANT PROBLEMS 113-15
(1967); Davidson, Accelerated Depreciation, in 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH
CONG., IST SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 807, 811 (Comm. Print 1959); Paton, The
Depreciation Deduction-LIFO Principle Should be Extended to Cover Depreciable Plant, in id.
at 877, 883; Peloubet, Depreciation Reform, in id. at 891, 899, 907.
278. See S. 720, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961); H.R. 422, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961).
279. As an example, assume that at the end of year ten depreciable property acquired in year
one at a cost of $100,000 is retired, and that replacement depreciable property costing $175,000
is purchased. (For a tabular example of how this depreciation method would have worked, see
Peloubet, Depreciation Reform, in 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., lST
SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 891, 907 (Comm. Print 1959).) The price index for year one
was 100 and the price index for year ten is 200. The reinvestment depreciation adjustment
during year ten is the lesser of:
(1) the excess of
(a) reinvestment amount $175,000
over
(b) historical cost of retired property 100,000
excess $ 75,000
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Several features distinguish reinvestment depreciation from the inflation
adjusted depreciation methods previously discussed. First, the deduction
under reinvestment depreciation is contingent upon reinvestment in depreci-
able property. Such reinvestment is not required under the other methods. If
there is no reinvestment, then no additional depreciation deduction is al-
lowed. 28° Secondly, under the reinvestment depreciation method the extra
depreciation allowed upon disposition of the old property constitutes a
reduction in the adjusted basis of the replacement property. Thus, reinvest-
ment depreciation is significantly different from general price level adjusted
depreciation methods two and three in that it does not generate, in the long
run, depreciation deductions larger than historical cost depreciation. 8 ' Al-
(2) the greater of
(a) the excess of
(i) inflation adjusted historical cost of
retired property: 200%($100,000) $200,000
over




(b) $50,000 $ 50,000
greater of (a) or (b) $100,000
Lesser of (I) or (2) $ 75,000
The reinvestment depreciation carryover from year ten is equal to the excess of:
(I) the amount in (2)(a) above $100,000
over
(2) the actual reinvestment depreciation allowed 75,000
carryover $ 25,000
Additionally, assume that at the end of year eleven, property acquired in year one at a cost of
$100,000 is retired and replacement depreciable property costing $250,000 is purchased. The
price index for year eleven is 210. The reinvestment depreciation adjustment for year eleven is
the lesser of:
(1) the excess of
(a) reinvestment amount $250,000
over
(b) historical cost of retired property 100,000
excess $150,000
or
(2) the greater of
(a) the sum of
(i) the excess of
[a] inflation adjusted historical cost
of retired property: 210%($ 100,000) $210,000
over




(ii) carryovers from year 10 25,000
sum of (i) and (ii) $135,000
or
(b) $50,000 $ 50,000
greater of (a) or (b) $135,000
Lesser of (1) or (2) $135,000
The reinvestment depreciation carryover from year eleven is equal to the excess of
(1) the amount in (2)(a) above $135,000
over
(2) the actual reinvestment depreciation allowed 1 0
carryover $
280. Reinvestment in depreciable property is required, but the proposal did not require
reinvestment in functionally similar property. Any depreciable property would have sufficed.
281. Davidson, Accelerated Depreciation, in 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH
CONG., 1ST SEss., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 811-12 (Comm. Print 1959).
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though both reinvestment depreciation and general price level depreciation
method one merely accelerate the rate of the historical cost depreciation,
timing differences between the two methods will exist because the deduc-
tion is taken over the useful life of the asset under method one but is taken in
the year of disposition under the reinvestment depreciation method.
Reinvestment depreciation has been criticized on several grounds. One of
the criticisms is that it generates large, irregular depreciation deductions.
Upon retirement of the old property and investment in new property, an
additional depreciation deduction is allowable. Depending on the rate of
inflation intervening between acquisition and disposition of the property,
the additional depreciation adjustment may be substantial. The additional
adjustment, therefore, may produce significant distortion of taxable in-
come. 282 Arguably, if an inflation adjustment is appropriate, it should be
spread over the life of the property, rather than bunched into the year of
disposition. Further, the taxpayer has substantial control over the timing of
the extra deduction by being able to control the disposition of the old
property. Out of concern that such control will be used in a manner which
would be disadvantageous to the federal government, general depreciation
principles preclude that control. 283 A second criticism is that the reinvest-
ment depreciation notion is conceptually inconsistent. It is argued that if an
inflation adjustment to depreciation is necessary in order to reflect the
economic consequences of the enterprise over time, then during periods of
inflation the adjustment should be in addition to historical cost depreciation,
rather than being a mere acceleration device. 284 Finally, reinvestment depre-
ciation would tend to provide a greater benefit to taxpayers with old proper-
ties because the additional allowance is tied into actual retirements. New
and growing taxpayers with no retirements during the year would receive no
more than $50,000 of additional depreciation. As a matter of macroeconomic
policy, that distribution of benefits seems inappropriate. If a tax inducement
is to be granted, it would seem more appropriate to give a greater benefit to
taxpayers who are investing in new property.
B. Other Proposed Modifications to Depreciation
Minor Substantive Revisions.285 Although inflation adjusted depreciation
has been in the spotlight in the most recent past, numerous other modifica-
tions to depreciation for federal income tax purposes have been proposed.
The proposed modifications range from relatively minor structural changes
to proposals which fundamentally alter depreciation. Although some of the
proposals represent minor structural or theoretical changes, their revenue
effects could be substantial.
The relatively less substantial changes, in general, seek to accelerate or
282. Id.
283. The concern was expressed in Crane which is discussed in the text accompanying notes
154-59 supra.
284. Paton, The Depreciation Deduction-LIFO Principle Should Be Extended to Cover
Depreciable Plant, in 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., IST SESS., TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM 877, 885 (Comm. Print 1959).
285. See generally G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 58-66 (1975).
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decelerate depreciation. Proposals to accelerate depreciation include mod-
ifications to additional first-year depreciation, salvage value, the ADR vari-
ance, useful life, and depreciation rates.28 6 Section 179 presently allows
additional first-year depreciation of twenty percent of the cost of the proper-
ty up to a maximum deduction limitation. 2 7 An expansion of the additional
first-year depreciation allowance to forty percent of the cost of the property
and elimination of the maximum deduction has been proposed. 218 Section
179 is merely an acceleration device and the proposed forty percent allow-
ance would simply increase the acceleration. Another modification proposal
is to amend the salvage value rules to increase depreciation. Section 167(f)
already allows a taxpayer to disregard, for salvage value purposes, up to ten
percent of the cost of the property. 289 The modification proposals would
either expand the percentage allowance, or completely disregard salvage
value in determining the net depreciable adjusted basis. 29° ADR depreciation
currently allows a twenty percent variance on useful life and it has been
proposed that the variance be increased to forty percent. 291 Finally, new
methods of accelerating depreciation have been proposed, 292 including triple
declining balance, which would allow depreciation at three times the straight
line rate. Alternatively, various proposals have been made to decelerate tax
depreciation. 29 3 In particular, the twenty percent useful life variance of ADR
depreciation has been criticized as an unwarranted and unfair provision
which should be repealed. Although each of the foregoing proposals might
have significant revenue consequences, none can be characterized as a
radical theoretical departure from present law.
Major Substantive Revisions. In addition to the minor revisions, various
substantial structural changes to tax depreciation have been proposed. The
scope of the proposals is wide and represents divergent views of the purpose
and merit of contemporary tax depreciation. One proposal which has re-
ceived a considerable amount of attention is allowing a "capital cost recov-
ery" deduction. Briefly stated, capital cost recovery is a method of depreci-
286. See generally 116 CONG. REC. 25,684, 25,686-88 (1970) (report of Dep't of the Treasury).
287. See text accompanying notes 104-106 supra.
288. 116 CONG. REC. 25,684, 25,686-87 (1970) (report of Dep't of the Treasury).
289. See text accompanying notes 136-38 supra.
290. 116 CONG. REC. 25,684, 25,686 (1970) (report of Dep't of the Treasury). Although the
proposals would increase the depreciable basis, upon disposition of the property gain would be
realized because the salvage value would exceed the adjusted basis of zero. The net effect is a
deferral of taxes, not an absolute reduction of taxes. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS
TAXATION, BUSINESS TAXATION 23 (1970).
291. 1 Tax Reform: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 88, 92 (1975) (statement of Walker Winter); 4 id. at 3036, 3043 (statement of Charles E.
Walker). See generally 3 id. at 2484, 2488 (statement of Charles Moeller); Kitendaugh, Depreci-
ation Policy for an Expanding Economy, in 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH
CONG., lST SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 841 (Comm. Print 1959).
292. 116 CONG. REC. 25,684, 25,688 (1970) (report of Dep't of the Treasury).
293. For proposals which would decelerate depreciation, see, e.g., FEDERAL TAX REFORM
FOR 1976, at 121-26 (S. Surrey, P. McDaniel, & J. Pechman eds. 1976); Eisner, Statement on
Investment Credit and Accelerated Depreciation and Amortization, in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, 93D CONG., IST SESS., PREPARED STATEMENTS, PANEL DISCUSSIONS ON TAX
REFORM, PANEL No. 3, at 35, 38 (Comm. Print 1973); 4 Tax Reform: Hearings Before the House




ation which would use an arbitrary recovery period, rather than the es-
timated useful life of the property. 94 The recovery period is intended to be
substantially shorter than the estimated useful life. The modern concept of
capital cost recovery depreciation came from the Task Force on Business
Taxation appointed by the President in September 1969.295 The Task Force
Report contained various recommendations with respect to business taxa-
tion. The stated goals of the recommendations were to encourage the expan-
sion of productive facilities, to bring United States tax depreciation more
closely in line with the treatment accorded in other industrial nations, to
mitigate the effect of inflation on depreciation, and to simplify present law
and minimize administrative disputes. 2 6 Specifically, the Report recom-
mended abandonment of the useful life concept for machinery and equip-
ment, and adoption of a capital cost recovery system based upon recovery
periods equal to Revenue Procedure 62-21 guideline lives reduced by forty
percent. The Report recommended the retention of existing useful life
depreciation with respect to depreciable real property improvements.
The Report was issued in September 1970, and in January 1971 the
Treasury announced the administrative adoption of ADR depreciation.
2 97
Although somewhat similar to capital cost recovery, ADR depreciation
adopted only a twenty percent reduction in the guideline lives. Moreover,
the reduction was explained in terms of providing a reasonable allowance
for obsolescence, rather than as an abandonment of the useful life
concept.2 98 The administrative adoption of ADR depreciation, therefore,
was not the equivalent of adoption of a capital cost recovery system.
Conceptually at least,299 ADR depreciation was reconcilable with the tradi-
tional concept of depreciation. Capital cost recovery depreciation, how-
294. See TAX FOUNDATION, INC., FEDERAL TAX CHANGES FOR THE FUTURE 25-26 (1970). A
position paper of the Council of Small and Independent Business Associations urged simplifica-
tion of tax depreciation for small businesses by allowing such taxpayers to use a 2-, 5-, or 10-
year useful life for all depreciable properties. Although the proposal was couched in the
language of simplification, it clearly would have had the effect of acceleration and is an
example of a capital cost recovery system. See DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA) No. 121, June 22,
1977, at G-6.
295. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION, BUSINESS TAXATION (1970). For an
earlier capital cost recovery system proposal, see Kitendaugh, Depreciation Policy for an
Expanding Economy, in 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., IST SESS., TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM 841, 850-51 (Comm. Print 1959).
296. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION, BUSINESS TAXATION 16-17
(1970). '
297. See text accompanying notes 183-200 supra.
298. There are two major sets of considerations which led to the decision to adopt the
ADR system-
(1) . . . [ease of administration]
(2) The statutory requirement that depreciation deductions include a 'rea-
sonable allowance for obsolescence' required a recognition of changing circum-
stances, current and anticipated, which call for permitting taxpayers to select
lives from a range which includes lives shorter than those permitted by existing
guidelines. The ADR system recognizes current and potential obsolescence as a
result of recently imposed environmental control requirements, an increasing
level of foreign competition, and high rates of capital formation since 1962 which
suggest rapid incorporation of technological improvements. These and other
factors indicate that depreciation allowances should not be tied to the past history
of the individual taxpayer-an unreliable guide to the period of future prod-
uctivity of the taxpayer's stock of capital assets.
Announcement 71-76, 1971-2 C.B. 503, 512-13.
299. For a discussion of whether ADR depreciation accurately reflects net income, see text
accompanying notes 318-29 infra.
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ever, is inconsistent with that tradition because the recovery period is
arbitrary and not related to useful life.
Even though ADR depreciation was administratively promulgated and
then codified in section 167(m), capital cost recovery has not been forgotten.
Various business groups have continued to promote its adoption. 3°° For
example, H.R. 8226,301 introduced in 1975, would have provided elective
capital cost recovery for depreciable tangible personal property and certain
tangible real property improvements. The bill provided a five-year recovery
period for personal property and a ten-year recovery period for real proper-
ty. 30 2 The bill also would have allowed the taxpayer to elect to deduct less
than the maximum allowance and carry forward the remaining amount. 303
The bill also proposed amendment of section 46(c)(2), which requires
conformity between the useful life used for purposes of determining the
investment credit and the useful life used for purposes of depreciation. The
amendment would have exempted capital cost recovery property from the
conformity requirement. 3° 4 The bill further would have exempted capital
cost recovery allowances from being treated as a tax preference item subject
to the minimum tax. 30 5 Obviously, the bill, had it been enacted, would have
been very generous to taxpayers who owned depreciable property.
Another substantial structural change to tax depreciation which has been
proposed is the immediate expensing of the cost of long life property during
the year of acquisition.3 6 This method has been referred to as "cash-flow"
depreciation. Rather than capitalizing the cost of depreciable property, the
entire expense would be allowed at the start of the ownership cycle. Im-
mediate expensing obviously is a radical departure from the current concept
of depreciation. Proponents of immediate expensing argue that it would
make producers more efficient and it would greatly simplify tax administra-
tion. There is no doubt that immediate expensing would simplify administra-
tion of the Internal Revenue Code by eliminating useful life, salvage value,
and rate of depreciation questions. The efficiency argument, however, is
more difficult to substantiate. It is argued that the taxpayer would better be
able to assess investment decisions without the distortions induced by the
300. 1 Tax Reform: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. 88, 91 (1975) (statement of Walker Winter); id. at 228, 239 (statement of Russel W.
Laxson); 2 id. at 1207, 1210 (statement of Ray M. Stroupe).
301. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
302. Id. § 3.
303. Id.
304. Id. § 4.
305. Id. § 5.
306. See, e.g., Dean, Capital Wastage Allowances, in 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 86TH CONG., IST SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 813, 820-21 (Comm. Print 1959);
Schiff, Benefits of Immediate Writeoffs, 58 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 11 (1976). Curiously,
Taxation with Representation, a self-described public interest taxpayer's lobby, included in its
presentation to the 1975 House Ways and Means Committee hearings on tax reform a paper
supporting immediate expensing. See 2 Tax Reform: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1229, 1229 (1975) (statement of Thomas Reese). In
addition, the Treasury Small Business Advisory Committee has recommended immediate
expensing for small business, but not in excess of $200,000 during any taxable year. See
TREASURY SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY COMM. ON ECONOMIC POLICY, REPORT OF RECOMMENDA-
TIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY 2 (Dec. 1976).
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tax consequences of useful life depreciation. In other words, it would
remove the tax disincentive to invest in long life property. It is further
argued that, as a matter of economic policy, it would improve resource
allocation and increase investment in long life property. Finally, immediate
expensing would most benefit growing taxpayers 30 7 who must make large
initial investments.
Immediate expensing, however, is subject to strong policy criticisms. The
most substantial tax policy criticism is the obvious distortion in net income
which this method produces. Our system of taxing periodic net income is
premised upon an effort to match revenues with the expenses of generating
those revenues. Immediate expensing of the cost of property which contrib-
utes to the generation of revenues throughout its useful life clearly distorts
the process of determining net income. A substantial deferral of tax liability
is thereby realized.
As a matter of economic policy, immediate expensing is criticized on the
ground that it would be pro-cyclical.30 8 During expansionary periods when
acquisitions of new property are most common the tax system should
operate to restrain the economy by increasing taxes. Immediate expensing,
however, would reduce taxable income by full acquisition cost. During
recessionary periods taxpayers would not benefit from depreciation deduc-
tions based on past expenditures made during an expansionary period.
Instead the taxpayer would have to make a current expenditure in order to
derive a tax benefit.
Another structural change to depreciation which has been proposed is
optional depreciation under which the taxpayer would be allowed complete
control over the timing of the depreciation deductions. 309 Presumably, the
rationale is to allow the taxpayer to take the deductions so as to maximize
the potential tax benefit. This proposal clearly would create instability in the
flow of federal revenues and has no theoretical support other than as an
economic stimulus.
The final substantial structural change proposal is related to the replace-
ment fund theory of depreciation. A deduction would be allowed at the time
the taxpayer makes a contribution of property to a sinking fund, the pro-
ceeds from which would be committed to the purchase of replacement
property. The deduction would be taken at the time of contribution to the
fund, before the acquisition of the property, rather than during its use. By
giving the taxpayer substantial control over the timing of the deduction, this
method would not contribute to the accurate reflection of net income and
would pose considerable administrative difficulties because the sinking fund
307. Possibly the best analysis of the economic efficiency argument is the proponent's
description of immediate expensing as a "tremendous incentive." Dean, Capital Wastage
Allowances, in 2 House COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX REVISION
COMPENDIUM 813, 814 (Comm. Print 1959).
308. See generally A. MURRAY, DEPRECIATION 27-28 (1971).
309. See, e.g., General Revenue Revision: Hearings Before House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 688, 689 (1953) (statement of Claude Dudley); R. POWELL,
MANAGEMENT VIEWS OF TAX DEPRECIATION 35-57 (Indiana Business Rep. No. 34, 1962);
Barlow, The Depreciation Impasse: A Measuring of the Pressure for Change and Strength of the
Resistance, 10 J. TAX. 66. 68 (1959).
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would have to be segregated and preserved solely for the purpose of pur-
chasing replacement property.
IV. ASSESSMENT OF MODIFICATION PROPOSALS
In assessing the foregoing proposed changes to contemporary deprecia-
tion, various evaluative standards are applied. 310 One standard is whether
the proposal is consistent with the underlying theoretical justification for
depreciation. The second standard is the correlation between actual
economic depreciation based on empirical evidence, and the depreciation
which would be generated by the proposal. If the available evidence indi-
cates that tax depreciation is slower or faster than economic depreciation,
an adjustment of tax depreciation would be in order. The third standard by
which to assess depreciation is to analyze its magnitude as a tax expendi-
ture. Tax expenditures are tax provisions which generate revenue losses by
providing special incentives. The fourth evaluative standard is to determine
whether the tax depreciation provision is efficient in generating increased
economic activity. In other words, does the benefit of increased economic
activity with the indirect result of increased tax revenues exceed the direct
revenue loss suffered as a result of the provision. A fifth evaluative standard
is comparing depreciation in the United States to depreciation provisions in
other countries. Finally, modification proposals must be assessed from the
perspective of fairness, or tax equity. Somewhat more reasoned and analyt-
ical conclusions about depreciation policy may be possible after application
of these evaluative standards.
A. Theoretical Justification
As previously discussed, there are different formulations of the theoretic-
al justification for depreciation. 31' The income theory asserts that the pur-
pose of depreciation is to determine periodic net income more accurately by
matching revenues and expenses throughout the useful life of the property.
The replacement fund theory alleges that the purpose of depreciation is to
generate a fund from which replacement property will be purchased. There
are other expressions of the theory of depreciation, but the fundamental
conceptual issue is the income theory, replacement fund theory dichotomy.
Because those theories are irreconcilable and lead to conflicting provisions,
depreciation must be premised on one or the other. Replacement fund
theory depreciation requires use of current replacement cost, while income
theory depreciation requires historical cost, or inflation adjusted historical
cost.
Ultimately, resolution of the issue is dependent on the meaning of the
phrase "net income," because depreciation is a deduction taken in deter-
mining net income. The problem, however, is that net income is expressed in
different ways. 312 One simplistic expression is that net income is the excess
of revenues over expenses. A somewhat more sophisticated expression is
310. See generally, W. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 103-38 (1976).
311. See text accompanying notes 218-30 supra.
312. For a discussion of the various meanings of income, see Discussion of Depreciation and
Changing Price Level, in DEPRECIATION AND TAXES 102, 109-24 (1959).
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that net income is the excess of revenues over expenses, with all expenses
stated in current period dollars. 313 Under this modified version, historical
cost depreciation would be adjusted to reflect changing price levels. 3 1 4 A
third and completely different version of net income is expressed as the
amount which may be distributed without impairing working capital.
3 1 5
While the first two versions focus on revenues and expenses, the third
version focuses on maintaining current productive capacity. Under the third
version, the amount of income will have to be reduced by replacement cost
depreciation, if current productive capacity is to be maintained. Productive
capacity can be sustained only by purchasing replacement property at cur-
rent cost. Historical cost depreciation, or even inflation adjusted historical
cost, will not be sufficient under this theory of net income, because they are
not tied into replacement cost.
The fallacy of the replacement fund theory of depreciation is that the
accumulated depreciation "reserve" contains no funds.3 1 6 There are no
funds available with which to purchase replacement property because no
resources are actually set aside in a sinking fund. A separate contribution to
a sinking fund may be made, but such a contribution is not required in order
to be eligible for a depreciation deduction. Depreciation itself quite simply
does not fund a replacement account.3 1 7 In addition, replacement cost depre-
ciation is inconsistent with the meaning of net income for federal income tax
purposes. The Internal Revenue Code determines taxable income by refer-
ence to revenues and expenses, not by reference to maintaining the working
capital of the taxpayer.
Accordingly, for federal income tax purposes, depreciation is a method of
allocating the cost of long life property over its useful life in order to
determine periodic net income accurately. Ideally, tax depreciation should
be equal to actual economic depreciation during the period, but valuation
difficulties require the use of mechanical devices to allocate the net cost of
the property over its useful life. Clearly, for tax purposes the income theory
of depreciation is correct; proposals which are premised on the replacement
fund theory should be rejected.
B. Empirical Evidence
Assuming that depreciation is a method to reflect net income accurately,
depreciation should reasonably reflect actual decline in value during the
313. ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING PROBLEMS OF THE ACCOUNT-
ING PROFESSION 20 (5th ed. 1976).
314. Id.
315. Committee on Concepts and Standards-Long-Lived Assets, American Accounting
Association, Accounting for Land, Buildings, and Equipment, 39 ACCOUNTING REV. 693, 695-
96 (1964).
316. R. KESTER, DEPRECIATION 94 (1924); E. SALIERS, DEPRECIATION 31-32 (3d ed. 1939). See
also, H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING 322 (6th ed. 1965); J. RYAN,
CURRENT DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES 56-57 (Studies in Industrial Economics No. 5, n.d.).
317. See generally ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING PROBLEMS OF
THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 20 (5th ed. 1976). After struggling with the problem for some
time, financial accounting has adopted the income theory of depreciation. Depreciation is
viewed as an allocation over time of cost, not a process of valuation. Like prepaid expenses,
depreciation deductions are to be taken during the period to which the item relates. See
discussion of the AICPA position on depreciation accounting, id. at 210-12.
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period. If actual decline in value exceeds tax depreciation, tax depreciation
needs to be accelerated; conversely, if actual decline in value is less than tax
depreciation, tax depreciation must be decelerated. The comparison of
economic depreciation to tax depreciation is made difficult by lack of
empirical evidence on economic depreciation. Accurate, publicly reported
statistics of actual decline in value of all classes of depreciable property
simply are not available. Because taxpayers do not make or report annual
determinations of value of depreciable properties, empirical evidence on
economic depreciation must be derived through alternative means. Such
alternative derivations are often theoretical and technically complicated
economic analyses. Nevertheless, there is an expanding body of such infor-
mation." ' These analyses are all relatively recent, due in large part to the
necessity of establishing a sufficiently lengthy historical record after adop-
tion of existing depreciation provisions. The analyses consider both the
useful life of the property and the rate of depreciation.
The studies indicate that useful life periods for tax purposes are shorter
than the actual useful life of the property. 19 With respect to equipment, the
difference is significant. The studies indicate that the 1962 guidelines
brought tax lives into relatively close conformity with actual useful lives.
320
After adoption of ADR depreciation, however, tax lives became signifi-
cantly shorter than actual useful lives. One study indicates that tax lives are
nineteen percent shorter than actual useful lives; 321 another study indicates
the difference is thirty-six percent. 322 With respect to depreciable real prop-
erty improvements, the difference between tax lives and actual service lives
is even greater.3 23 One study determines the difference to be thirty-five
318. A partial bibliography of relatively recent items includes R. COEN, DEPRECIATION,
PROFITS, AND RATES OF RETURN IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 3-32 (Office of Tax Analysis
Paper 3, Dep't of the Treasury 1975); Furstenberg, Corporate Taxes and Financing Under
Continuing Inflation, in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE STUDIES ON CONTEMPORARY
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 225, 229-34 (W. Fellner ed. 1976); Hulten & Wykoff, EmpiricalEvidence
on Economic Depreciation of Structures, in CONFERENCE ON TAX RESEARCH 1975, at 107 (1975);
Taubman & Rasche, Subsidies, Tax Law, and Real Estate Investment, in 3 JOINT ECONOMIC
COMM., 92D CONG., 2D SESS., ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 343 (Joint Comm.
Print 1972); Beidleman, Economic Depreciation in a Capital Goods Industry, 29 NAT'L TAX J.
379 (1976); Brannon & Sunley, The "Recapture" of Excess Tax Depreciation on the Sale of Real
Estate, 29 NAT'L TAX. J. 413, 419-20 (1976); Coen, Investment Behavior, The Measurement of
Depreciation and Tax Policy, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 59, 69-73 (1975).
319. Furstenberg, Corporate Taxes and Financing Under Continuing Inflation, in AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE STUDIES ON CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 225, 230-31 (W. Fell-
ner ed. 1976); Beidleman, Economic Depreciation in a Capital Goods Industry, 29 NAT'L TAX J.
379, 389 1976); Brannon & Sunley, The "Recapture" of Excess Tax Depreciation on the Sale of
Real Estate, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 413, 420 (1976); Coen, Investment Behavior, The Measurement of
Depreciation, and Tax Policy, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 59, 69 (1975).
320. Beidleman, Economic Depreciation in a Capital Goods Industry, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 379,
386 (1976); Coen, Investment Behavior, The Measurement of Depreciation, and Tax Policy, 65
AM. ECON. REV. 59, 69 (1975).
321. Coen, Investment Behavior, The Measurement of Depreciation, and Tax Policy, 65 AM.
ECON. REV. 59, 69 (1975).
322. Beidleman, Economic Depreciation in a Capital Goods Industry, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 379,
386 (1976).
323. See, e.g., Hulten & Wykoff, Empirical Evidence on Economic Depreciation of Struc-
tures, in CONFERENCE ON TAX RESEARCH 1975, at 107, 122-28 (1975); Coen, Investment Behav-
ior, The Measurement of Depreciation, and Tax Policy, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 59, 70 (1975);
Taubman & Rasche, Economic and Tax Depreciation of Office Buildings, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 334,
342 (1969). See also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REAL ESTATE TAX SHELTER SUBSIDIES
AND DIRECT SUBSIDY ALTERNATIVES 23 n. 18 (1977).
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percent,32 4 while the findings of another study indicate the difference to be
approximately forty-four percent.
325
The rate of depreciation has also been subjected to comparative analysis.
Accelerated depreciation methods for equipment seem to be supported by
the analyses.3 26 The value of equipment declines more rapidly in the early
years of use. Although the annual amount of tax depreciation exceeds
the amount of economic depreciation, the difference is attributable to useful
lives which are too short, rather than accelerated depreciation being inaccu-
rate in principle.3 27 With respect to depreciable real property improvements,
however, the studies indicate that accelerated depreciation does not accu-
rately reflect actual change in value. 328 Actual decline in value is much less
rapid than tax depreciation. Indeed, it appears that even straight line depre-
ciation is inaccurate. The method which would best reflect economic depre-
ciation is a method slower than straight line, a method such as reverse sum
of the years digits. 329 The evidence indicates that economic depreciation is
quite slow at first when a building is new and that depreciation increases in
amount as the age of the building increases.
324. Coen, Investment Behavior, The Measurement of Depreciation, and Tax Policy, 65 AM.
ECON. REV. 59, 70 (1975).
325. Taubman & Rasche, Economic and Tax Depreciation of Office Buildings, 22 NAT'L
TAX J. 334, 342 (1969). The authors propose lengthening the useful life of structures by 20 years,
from 45 to 65 years. The 20-year adjustment represents 44% of the present 45-year useful life.
326. Beidleman, Economic Depreciation in a Capital Goods Industry, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 379,
389 (1976).
327. Id.
328. See, e.g., Hulten & Wykoff, Empirical Evidence on Economic Depreciation of Struc-
tures, in CONFERENCE ON TAX RESEARCH 1975, at 107, 122-23 (1975); Taubman & Rasche,
Subsidies, Tax Law, and Real Estate Investment, in 3 JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 92D CONG., 2D
SESS., THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 343, 343-44 (Joint Comm. Print 1972);
Coen, Investment Behavior, The Measurement of Depreciation, and Tax Policy, 65 AM. ECON.
REV. 59, 72 (1975).
329. See Taubman & Rasche, Subsidies, Tax Law, and Real Estate Investment, in 3 JOINT
ECONOMIC COMM., 92D CONG., 2D SESS., THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 343,
344 (Joint Comm. Print 1972). Algebraically, the sum of the years digits method is expressed as:
X = annual depreciation
Y = years of useful life remaining (including current year)
T = total useful life
Z = depreciable adjusted basis
Algebraically, reverse sum of the years digits is expressed as:
X= ~;(T+ Z
X = annual depreciation
N = years of useful life remaining at end of current year
T = total useful life
Z = depreciable adjusted basis
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In conclusion, the empirical evidence indicates that tax depreciation ex-
ceeds economic depreciation. Useful life for tax purposes clearly is too
short, for both equipment and structures. Accelerated rates accurately re-
flect decline in value in equipment, but not structures. The studies indicate
there exists a substantial tax subsidy for investors in depreciable property.
C. Depreciation as a Tax Expenditure
Tax depreciation which exceeds economic depreciation constitutes an
affirmative inducement to invest in depreciable property. Because the de-
preciation is too rapid and results in a deferral of tax liability, it has been
referred to as a "tax expenditure. 330 Tax expenditures are revenue losses
resulting from tax provisions which allow a special exclusion, exemption,
deduction, or rate of tax which differs from the normal structure of the
income tax.33' Any deviation from the standard structure of taxing net
income at uniform rates which results in a revenue loss is a tax expenditure.
The concept of tax expenditures is relatively new.332 As the Internal
Revenue Code became more complex and as various special inducements
worked their way into the structure, the revenue losses attributable to the
special provisions began to rise. The thrust of the tax expenditure theory is
that tax expenditures, like traditional subsidy programs using direct budget-
ary expenditures, should be accounted for to enable Congress to monitor
their continued validity.
Due to the efforts of former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy Stanley S. Surrey, a tax expenditure budget was published in 1968 as
part of the annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury.333 The tax
expenditure budget included in addition to direct governmental expendi-
tures, expenditures in the form of revenues forgone which were attributable
to the tax expenditure items. The tax expenditures, or "backdoor" expendi-
tures, were thus exposed to allow annual review by Congress. Previously,
tax expenditures had been reviewed only once, upon adoption, rather than
periodically, as are direct subsidies.
Agitation for greater consideration of the consequences of tax expendi-
ture items contributed to the passage of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974.334 That Act required as part of the annual
budgetary process the disclosure of estimated revenue losses associated
with each tax expenditure. The purpose behind the Act was to generate
further consideration of the hidden consequences of tax expenditures. 335 In
addition, tax expenditures could be evaluated with respect to efficiency and
fairness standards. By revealing the magnitude of revenue loss, it was
330. See generally SENATE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., TAX EXPENDI-
TURES 1-3 (Comm. Print 1976).
331. I S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL, & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 239-
40 (1972).
332. The phrase apparently was first used in a 1967 speech by Stanley S. Surrey, then
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy. S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM Vii
(1973).
333. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 1968 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES 322-40 (1969).
334. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974).
335. S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 1-6 (1973).
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thought that tax expenditures which could no longer be justified would be
eliminated or restricted.336 Although the tax expenditure budget has been
sharply criticized,33 7 it appears to have continuing merit in the policy-making
process. The tax expenditure theory is no panacea, but it is a useful source
of information about tax revenues and expenditures, both actual and
constructive.
It has been argued that tax expenditures are preferable to direct expendi-
ture programs because tax expenditures involve less governmental intrusion
and control.338 Although that libertarian argument is appealing, the response
is that direct expenditure programs could be equally free of such intrusion
and control; Congress, however, determined it to be in the public interest to
prescribe some governmental supervision. On the negative side, tax expend-
itures suffer from several defects. One criticism is that tax expenditures
are overbroad and inefficient because some taxpayers who benefit would
have acted in the desired manner absent the tax expenditure.339 That may be
true, but it is also true of direct expenditures. Another substantial criticism
of tax expenditures is that they are inequitable in terms of their distribution
of the benefits. Tax expenditures in the form of special deductions benefit
the taxpayer in relation to the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. The higher the
taxpayer's marginal tax rate, the greater the benefit to be realized. Accord-
ingly, high bracket taxpayers obtain the greatest benefit.34 It is questionable
whether Congress could, as a political matter, enact a direct subsidy with
such a distribution of benefits. Tax expenditures are also criticized because
they contribute to high tax rates by restricting the tax base. 341 Direct expend-
itures also keep the rate structure high, but with a broader tax base the
consequences are different. The combination of tax expenditures and a
narrow tax base lead to persons with significant economic incomes having
no tax liability. A broader based income tax would restrict the possibilities
of that happening. Finally, tax expenditures, as governmental subsidy pro-
grams, should not be effected through the income tax system. 342 Such use
perverts the revenue generating function of the tax structure and unneces-
sarily involves the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service
in the administration of governmental subsidy programs.
Excess depreciation is considered to be a tax expenditure item.3 43 Thus,
the depreciation attributable to the twenty percent reduction in service life
resulting from ADR is considered to be a tax expenditure. The estimated
revenue loss for fiscal year 1977 attributable solely to ADR depreciation is
336. 2 Tax Reform: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1454, 1454-57 (1975) (statement of Jerome Kurtz).
337. Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes" and Political Rhetoric, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1099
(1973).
338. 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL, & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 259-
60 (1972).
339. Id. at 261.
340. S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 50-91 (1973).
341. Id.
342. 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL, & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 266-
70 (1972); 2 Tax Reform: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1454, 1454-57 (1975) (statement of Jerome Kurtz).




$1,805,000,000. 3" Moreover, the revenue loss attributable to depreciation
may be considerably higher than this estimate. Empirical evidence indicates
that actual depreciation is considerably slower than tax depreciation,3 45
particularly with respect to realty. 346 Because realty is not subject to ADR
depreciation, depreciation is a larger tax expenditure than the $1.8 billion
estimate indicates. The computational difficulties in attempting to quantify
the additional tax expenditure portion of depreciation preclude a more
definite revenue loss estimate.
The clear message of the tax expenditure concept is that the tax system
should not be used as an indirect device by which to distribute government
subsidies. The foregoing empirical evidence indicates that tax depreciation
exceeds economic depreciation, thus constituting a tax subsidy.
D. Economic Efficiency
Given the existence of a tax subsidy for depreciable property, it becomes
necessary to consider the economic efficiency of the subsidy. The argument
supporting excessive tax depreciation is that it will increase the after-tax
rate of return on investment in depreciable property and, therefore, it will
induce more taxpayers to invest in depreciable property. 347 This investment
in productive capacity, it is maintained, will lead to the creation of new jobs,
increased economic activity, and a higher standard of living. 48 Efficiency is
measured by determining the revenue loss attributable to excessive depreci-
ation and comparing it to the indirect revenue gain attributable to the
increased economic activity. If the efficiency factor is high enough, in-
creased federal tax revenues may exceed the revenue loss.
Effectiveness of excessive depreciation, as a macroeconomic policy tool,
is to be measured by the increase in investment in depreciable property
attributable to the excess depreciation. 349 The economic evidence on that
issue is complex and confused. 350 A number of studies indicate varying
degrees of affirmative investor responsiveness to accelerated deprecia-
tion, 35 1 while other studies conclude that investor behavior is not signifi-
344. Id.
345. See text accompanying notes 318-29 supra.
346. See authorities cited supra note 323.
347. See A. MURRAY, DEPRECIATION 100 (1971); Smith, Tax Policy and Business Investment,
in FISCAL POLICY AND BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION 19, 22 (1967); Terborgh, Depreciation as
an Element in Investment Decisions, in DEPRECIATION AND TAXES 17 (1959).
348. This formulation of the economic justification for too rapid depreciation is compre-
hensible, but the matter may be considerably more complex than that. A number of other
variables influence the results. See Brannon, The Effects of Tax Incentives for Business
Investment: A Survey of the Economic Evidence, in 3 JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 92D CONG., 2D
SESS., THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 245, 253-54 (Joint Comm. Print 1972).
349. For an analysis of the time effects of changes in the depreciation provisions see the
testimony of Laurence W. Woodworth, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy,
before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Finance Committee,
in TAX NOTES, Aug. 22, 1977, at 9.
350. See generally A. MURRAY, DEPRECIATION (1971); 116 CONG. REC. 25,684 (1970) (report
of Dep't of the Treasury); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, AN
ANALYSIS OF TAX PROVISIONS AFFECTING BUSINESS INVESTMENTS (1974).
351. For a brief overview of these studies, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, AN ANALYSIS OF TAX PROVISIONS AFFECTING BUSINESS INVESTMENT 28-32 (1974).
See also N. TURE, ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1954-60, at 100 (Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research Fiscal Study No. 9, 1967).
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cantly affected352 by the presence of tax inducements to invest in depreci-
able property.35 3 Economic analyses by their nature are qualified and impre-
cise. The economic efficiency criterion simply has not been sufficiently
quantified 354 to be of substantial assistance in evaluating depreciation policy
options. 355
E. Depreciation Allowances in Other Countries
It has been suggested that an appropriate evaluative standard for tax
depreciation is to compare tax treatment in the United States and tax
treatment in other countries, particularly in countries with which we trade,
or with which we compete. It should be noted, however, that this is a
relative, or comparative evaluation, rather than an absolute evaluation. The
fact that other countries have faster or slower depreciation than the United
States does not prove which system is best or most accurate.
The Report of the President's Task Force on*Business Taxation 356 in-
cluded a discussion of depreciation allowances in other industrialized na-
tions. 57 The results were striking in that the United States after passage of
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 appeared to have the slowest depreciation
system of all the countries. 58 Subsequent to that report, however, the
investment tax credit was reintroduced and ADR depreciation was enact-
ed. 359 An updated version of the report now indicates that the depreciation
system of the United States is no longer the slowest.316 Indeed, it now
appears that the depreciation system of the United States is more rapid than
most of the other countries.3 61 In summary, depreciation policy in the United
352. See, e.g., Fromm, Introduction, in TAX INCENTIVES AND CAPITAL SPENDING 5 (G.
Fromm ed. 1967); Eisner, Effects of Depreciation Allowances for Tax Purposes, in 2 HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., IST SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 793, 795-96
(Comm. Print 1959); 2 Tax Increase Proposals: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 396 (1974) (statement of Senator Edward Kennedy).
353. The congressional Budget Office has recently released a report analyzing tax shelter
subsidies for real estate. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REAL ESTATE TAX SHELTER SUB-
SIDIES AND DIRECT SUBSIDY ALTERNATIVES (1977). The report concludes generally that the tax
subsidies are inefficient in the sense that the intended beneficiaries, builders and developers, do
not receive the entire benefit. Of the estimated $1,300,000,000 annual tax subsidy, the study
estimates that only one half of the subsidy benefits builders and developers. The other one half
is siphoned off by syndicators, lawyers, accountants, and other participants. The report
suggests that a more efficient device would be a direct subsidy to the builders and developers.
Id. at 67-72.
354. See notes 351-52 supra.
355. A. MURRAY, DEPRECIATION 103-05 (1971); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REAL ES-
TATE TAX SHELTER SUBSIDIES AND DIRECT SUBSIDY ALTERNATIVES 48-49 (1977); CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, AN ANALYSIS OF TAX PROVISIONS AFFECT-
ING BUSINESS INVESTMENT 28-32 (1974); 116 CONG. REC. 25,684, 25,691 (1970) (report of Dep't
of the Treasury); see Fromm, Introduction, in TAX INCENTIVES AND CAPITAL SPENDING 2-6 (G.
Fromm ed. 1967).
356. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION, BUSINESS TAXATION (1970).
357. Id. at 7-11.
358. Id. at 8-11 (Table II, Graph A).
359. Those provisions were contained in the Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§
101-09, 85 Stat. 497, 498-510; see text accompanying notes 183-203 supra.
360. 1 Tax Reform: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 88, 157-59 (1975) (statement of Walker Winter).
361. The cost recovery period utilized by the United States is one of the longer periods
required. When the combined effects of additional first year depreciation, I.R.C. § 167(f),
accelerated methods, and the investment credit are considered, however, the relative position
of the United States improves substantially. In analyzing aggregate cost recovery allowances at
the end of the first, third, and seventh years, the United States is in the middle range of the
countries listed. I Tax Reform: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th
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States does not deviate substantially from depreciation policies in other
countries. Depreciation allowances may have been somewhat slow, in a
relative sense, in the past, but present depreciation allowances are not
inadequate, comparatively speaking.
F. Fairness Considerations
Analyzing tax depreciation from the perspective of equitable considera-
tions is difficult, due to differences of opinion as to what is fair.3 62 General
agreement should be reached, however, on the principle that taxation should
involve the neutral application of uniform principles.3 63 From a fairness
viewpoint, a tax provision which grants special treatment to a single class of
taxpayers is disfavored. In the context of depreciation, it is inequitable for
holders of depreciable property to receive preferred tax treatment. It seems
clear that holders of depreciable property do receive preferred tax treatment
under present law, because the empirical evidence indicates that tax depre-
ciation exceeds economic depreciation. 364 In this light, any proposal to
accelerate tax depreciation further would aggravate the equity problem,
whereas proposals to decelerate tax depreciation would make the system
more equitable.
With respect to inflation adjusted depreciation, there are several equity
considerations. To the extent that inflation adjusted depreciation would
increase depreciation deductions, the difference between tax depreciation
and economic depreciation would be increased, further benefiting the own-
ers of depreciable property. Inflation adjusted depreciation is also objec-
tionable on grounds of fairness because it is discriminatory. 365 All taxpayers
suffer from inflation, but under the proposals only holders of depreciable
property would receive relief. The selective application of the relief provi-
sion is manifestly unfair.366 A response to the fairness objection might be
that a comprehensive system protecting all taxpayers could be enacted, and
the inflation adjusted depreciation provision would be only one element of
the system. 367
Cong., 1st Sess. 88, 157-59 (1975) (statement of Walker Winter). Even so, Mr. Winter claims
that American business "is at'a distinct disadvantage with regard to replacing its obsolete
machinery and equipment." Id. at 93. See also 3 id. at 2469, 2477-78 (statement of John M.
Hamrick).
362. See Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 579-80
(1965).
363. See generally W. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 103-38 (1976).
364. See text accompanying notes 318-29 supra.
365. See generally A. MURRAY, DEPRECIATION 26-27 (1971); Discussion of Depreciation and
Changing Price Level, in DEPRECIATION AND TAXES 104-06 (1959); 2 Tax Reform: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 1311, 1316 (1975)
(statement of John J. Gilligan).
366. Even though the unfairness seems clear, it has been argued that the equitable objection
is a red herring. See Paton, The Depreciation Deduction-LIFO Principle Should be Extended to
Cover Depreciable Plant, in 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., IST SESS., TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM 877, 885 (Comm. Print 1959). But see Peloubet, Depreciation Reform in
id. at 891, 897, where it is argued that the equitable concern should be discounted because it will
pale in comparison with the increased economic well-being to be enjoyed by all taxpayers due
to the changed depreciation provision.
367. Such a system would include an inflation adjustment for all taxpayers, not just holders
of depreciable property. Rates, exemptions, or credits could be indexed by an inflation factor
so that all taxpayers would be protected from inflation. See G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL
TAX REFORM 36-41 (1975); Manuel, Adjusting to Inflation, TAX NOTES, Apr. 4, 1977, at 9. See




Depreciation policy has been constantly moving. Substantial changes in
tax depreciation have occurred since the first income tax statutes early in
the century. No doubt depreciation policy will continue to change in the
future. The problem revolves around determining the direction in which
depreciation policy should move. This is a particularly important time for
reassessment of depreciation policy because the Carter administration tax
reform proposal has been formulated.36 The Carter proposal will encompass
a broad range of reforms, and Congress will be called upon to reassess
fundamental tax policy with respect to a number of subjects, one of which is
depreciation. 369
A. Nature of the Depreciation Deduction
Policy makers first should seek to dispose of several theoretical issues
with respect to depreciation. If the theoretical questions can be resolved,
policy choices with respect to depreciation may be less confusing. One of
the theoretical issues is to determine the purpose of depreciation within the
federal income tax structure, 370 that is, whether depreciation is a matching
device by which better to determine net income, 371 or whether depreciation
is a device to provide a fund for the replacement of exhausted depreciable
property. 372 Resolution of this issue seems to be straightforward. The pur-
pose of depreciation is to assist in determining periodic net income where
long life property is used. It would be distortive to expense the entire cost of
the long life property in the year of acquisition, or the year of disposition, so
the depreciation device allocates the cost of the property over its period of
use. Clearly the theoretical basis for depreciation is the matching concept.
Depreciation simply does not create a fund from which replacement proper-
ty can be purchased.3 73
Recognizing that present law depreciation does not generate replacement
funds, Congress could consider changing present law by adopting the re-
placement fund theory. Adoption of that theory could be accomplished by
allowing a deduction for a contribution to a sinking fund, or some related
device. 374 Adoption of the replacement fund theory, however, would consti-
tute a serious break from our tradition of taxing net income. 375 Because
adoption of replacement fund depreciation would severely impair the net
368. See 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 158, 167 (Jan. 21, 1978).
369. The Carter proposals with respect to depreciation are limited to real property deprecia-
tion. Useful lives would be determined by reference to average depreciable lives reported in
surveys conducted by the Treasury Department. Generally, depreciation would be computed
pursuant to the straight line method, with two exceptions. Multi-family housing would be
allowed to use the 150% declining balance method through 1982, when straight line depreciation
would be required. Low income housing, the perennial favored child, would be allowed to use
the 200% declining balance method through 1982, when depreciation would be limited to the
150% declining balance method. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX PRO-
GRAM, FACT SHEET 15 (1978).
370. See generally G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 58-66 (1975).
371. See text accompanying notes 225-27 supra.
372. See text accompanying notes 219-24 supra.
373. See authorities cited supra note 316.
374. See text following note 309 supra.
375. Emory, The Corman and Mills-Mansfield Bills: A Look at Some Major Tax Reform
Issues, 29 TAX L. REV. 3, 50 (1973).
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income foundation of our tax structure, any such proposal should be re-
jected.
Another theoretical issue with respect to depreciation is whether depreci-
ation should be a neutral deduction in determining net income, or whether it
should be a stimulative inducement to investing in depreciable property. 376
Reduced to its simplest terms, depreciation should be a neutral deduction in
determining net income. Congress, however, has utilized the depreciation
deduction as an indirect device by which to subsidize investment in depreci-
able property. 377 The revenue loss associated with excess depreciation is
substantial, whereas the benefits are not objectively subject to assessment.
Thus, at present, policy makers are not adequately informed about deprecia-
tion as an economic stimulus. In sum, the benefits of excessive depreciation
are largely unknown and probably never will be quantified, while the detri-
ments of excessive depreciation are numerous and, to a limited degree,
quantifiable. It can be argued, therefore, that excessive depreciation cannot
on balance be justified as an efficient economic stimulus, and should be
eliminated. As a result of imperfect knowledge about the effects of exces-
sive depreciation, the issue becomes more political and less analytical. In
light of the imperfect knowledge of the issue, it is submitted that deprecia-
tion generally should be a neutral matching device rather than an affirmative
economic stimulus device.
B. Breadth of Depreciation Provisions
Another issue with respect to depreciation theory is to determine how
specialized depreciation should be. Present law has separate depreciation or
amortization treatment for personal property, real property, low-income
rental housing rehabilitation expenditures, public utility property, certified
historic structures, pollution control facilities, lessee improvements, rail-
road rolling stock, railroad tunnels, on-the-job training and child care
facilities, and expenditures to remove barriers to the handicapped and
elderly. The plethora of provisions is almost overpowering. In principle,
depreciation is a simple concept, but it has been seized upon as a device by
which to work social and economic wonders. All of the various provisions
are supported by some policy justification, but enough is enough. Seeking to
resolve social ills by use of the taxing system generates several problems. 378
The first and most obvious objection to the numerous provisions is the
complexity and confusion which is created. As the Internal Revenue Code
becomes more complex, only the tax professionals will have sufficient
competency to handle tax matters. Public acceptance and support for the
system will suffer. The second objection is that most of the special rules are
tax expenditures in that they are indirect subsidy devices which are not
376. See David, Statement Before the Committee on Ways and Means on the ADR System,
in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D CONG., IST SESS., PREPARED STATEMENTS, PANEL
DISCUSSIONS ON TAX REFORM, PANEL No. 3, at 1, 1-4 (Comm. Print 1973); 2 Tax Reform:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1176, 1177-78
(1975) (statement of Robert L. Loitz). See generally A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY
(1975).
377. See text accompanying notes 318-29 supra.
378. See generally S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 126-74 (1973).
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exposed periodically to the full legislative process, as are direct expenditure
programs. The third objection is that the Internal Revenue Code is being
asked to do too much. The primary function of any tax system is to generate
revenues. Any other purposes are secondary, and should be pursued only in
unusual circumstances. Tax provisions, such as the special railroad provi-
sions, intended to benefit only particular industries are subject to the criti-
cism that they are indirect subsidies which are unrelated to the revenue
generating function. Provisions dealing with certified historical structures
and architectural barriers to the handicapped obviously are not related to the
revenue generating function. Another significant problem associated with
attacking economic or social ills through the taxing system is that the
administrative burden is placed on the IRS and the Treasury, rather than a
governmental bureau more technically qualified to administer the govern-
ment program.
379
C. Sunset Bills and Periodic Review
If tax expenditures must remain in the Code it is imperative that an
automatic procedure be instituted to review their merit on a continuing
basis. For example, present law depreciation is too rapid; it would therefore
be appropriate for Congress to reassess whether the special treatment is
justified. Such a proposal was contained in the S. 2, Sunset Act of 1977.380
The goal of the bill was to institutionalize periodic review. Sunset acts are
relatively new creatures of the law and generally have been applied to
legislative and administrative bureaucracies, but in S. 2 tax expenditures
were included. 38I The bill automatically would have terminated all tax ex-
penditures after five years absent an affirmative action by Congress to
preserve them. 382 Unfortunately, tax expenditures were dropped from S.
2.383 The political battles over preserving cherished tax provisions would
have been intense, and Congress apparently was unwilling to engage in those
political battles every five years. There is little doubt that conditions justify-
ing tax expenditures change over time. It seems appropriate, therefore, that




Federal tax policy with respect to depreciation has followed a long and
winding path. Depreciation under present law represents an amalgam of
various theoretical bases and is a complex product of tax, economic, and
social policy goals. In analyzing and evaluating present law and proposed
379. See id.
380. S. 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 411-12 (1977).
381. Id. §§ 401-12.
382. This concern was present in the 1976 provisions with respect to certified historic
structures, I.R.C. §§ 167(o), 191. The sections provide for automatic termination in five years.
383. The House Governmental Affairs Committee voted to delete tax expenditures from the
bill. See TAX NOTES, July 4, 1977, at 7.




modifications to depreciation, certain conclusions may be reached. One
conclusion is that present law depreciation is more rapid than economic
depreciation, particularly with respect to real property improvements.
Another conclusion is that excessive depreciation is an indirect subsidy, a
tax expenditure, which is not subject to periodic review by Congress and
which cannot be objectively justified as an efficient economic stimulus.
Moreover, present depreciation is discriminatory because it unfairly bene-
fits holders of depreciable property. Finally, depreciation in the United
States is not significantly slower than depreciation in other major industrial
countries.
B. Guiding Principles
Ultimately Congress must decide what, if anything, to do about deprecia-
tion. The range of options is broad indeed. Congress could radically alter the
nature of depreciation, modify it in relatively minor ways, or leave it as it
is.3"5 No doubt, Congress will have to reconsider depreciation periodically as
political and economic pressures change. In considering changes, some
important principles should be kept in mind. First, depreciation is a relative-
ly simple concept and extensive statutory treatment of the subject is un-
necessary. Second, depreciation is a device which seeks to make a rea-
sonable allocation of the cost of long life property over its useful life. Any
provision which deviates from that principle will cause distortion in net
income and should be avoided. Deviations which claim to be justified on
macroeconomic policy grounds are difficult to evaluate objectively and the
burden of persuasion should be on the proponents. The third principle is that
while ease of administration is an appropriate and necessary component of
any tax system, administrative disputes over depreciation will occur. Tax
depreciation provisions, no matter how generous, will not satisfy all of the
taxpayers all of the time. It is inappropriate for Congress to compromise the
primary function of the tax system to raise revenue merely to avoid adminis-
trative disputes. Congress should not give way on depreciation just because
taxpayers complain, sometimes quite loudly.
C. Recommendations
Premised on the foregoing principles and the available evidence on con-
temporary depreciation, several recommendations can be made with respect
to change in depreciation policy. It appears that present law depreciation
provisions are too complex and too numerous. Congress should simplify and
condense them. It also appears that present law depreciation is too rapid and
causes a distortion in determining taxable income. Congress should deceler-
ate depreciation by requiring longer useful lives. A necessary first step in
that direction is repeal of ADR depreciation. 311 Congress also should repeal
385. See the various options discussed in text accompanying notes 253-309 supra.
386. See FEDERAL TAX REFORM FOR 1976, at 121-26 (S. Surrey, P. McDaniel, & J. Pechman
eds. 1976). H.R. 1040, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 402 (1977) would repeal ADR depreciation and
codify the reserve ratio test of Rev. Proc. 61-21, 1962-2 C.B. 418. For an explanation of H.R.
1040, see DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA) No. 18, Jan. 26, 1977, at J-I. In addition Senator Edward
Kennedy has proposed repeal of ADR depreciation. See 123 CONG. REC. S11,408, SI1,414
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accelerated depreciation for real property improvements and adopt a
method which is slower than straight line. 387 Inflation adjusted depreciation
seems appealing as a device to determine net income more accurately. There
are, however, significant objections to inflation adjusted depreciation. The
statute certainly would become more complex. Another substantial objec-
tion to inflation adjusted depreciation is that it would be unfair to protect
only holders of depreciable property from the effects of inflation. Due to the
fundamental unfairness of selective relief from the effects of inflation,
inflation adjusted depreciation should not be adopted, unless it is part of a
comprehensive package of inflation relief provisions which apply to all
taxpayers.
(daily ed. July I, 1977) (statement by Senator Edward Kennedy). See also Senator Haskell's
bill, S. 1989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
387. 123 CONG. REC. SI 1,408, SI 1,411 (daily ed. July 1, 1977) (statement by Senator Edward
Kennedy).
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